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Receipt of Payment in Installment
Sales Transactions: Wraparound
Mortgages and Letters of Credit
I. INTRODUCTION
The installment sales provisions of the Internal Revenue Code'
allow a taxpayer to defer the recognition of income realized from a
sale of property. Ordinarily, the profit realized on the sale of prop-
erty is recognized as income in the year of sale.2 However, when
the sale proceeds are received in installment payments over sev-
eral tax years, the seller may not have cash available in the year of
sale to pay the tax on the total profit realized. The purpose of the
installment sales provisions is to relieve the taxpayer from the in-
equity of requiring immediate recognition of taxable gain when he
has received only a portion of the sale proceeds.3 The Code allows
the seller to recognize and report as income a percentage4 of each
deferred installment payment he receives; the remainder is a re-
turn of basis.5 In this way, the recognition of income may be de-
ferred to the time of the actual payments, and the tax on the profit
from the sale of the property may be paid out of the sale proceeds
as they are received.
* This Comment was awarded the Robert G. Simmons Nebraska Law Practice
Award, October 1982.
1. I.R.C. §§ 453, 453A, 453B (Supp. IV 1980).
2. LR.C. §§ 1001(a)-(c) (amount realized), 451(a) (timing of gain realized)
(1976).
3. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948).
4. The gross profit ratio is the gross profit realized or to be realized divided by
the total contract price. The contract price is equal to the total sale price
minus the amount of any mortgage or other indebtedness encumbering the
property which the buyer assumed or took subject to and which does not
exceed the seller's basis in the property. See Temporary Treas. Reg.
§ 15a.453-1(b) (2), 1981-10 I.R.B. 13.
5. A taxpayer's basis in property is generally equal to the historical cost of the
property to the taxpayer. LILC. § 1012 (1976). The adjusted basis for calculat-
ing gain or loss on a transaction involving the property is the cost of the prop-
erty adjusted by the applicable provisions of LRC. § 1016. The most common
adjustment is the reduction of the property's basis for the depreciation de-
duction taken with respect to the property.
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The installment sales provisions have been a part of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code since 1926.6 However, until the recent congres-
sional enactment of the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,7
the benefits of the installment method were difficult to obtain. The
taxpayer had to affirmatively elect installment treatment in a
timely manner,8 and there were several -conditions which, if vio-
lated, disqualified the sale from the benefits of installment report-
ing.9 For example, an installment was defined as one of two or
more payments, and a sale requiring a single future payment did
not qualify.10 The most onerous disqualifying provision was the
thirty percent initial payment limitation," which rendered install-
ment treatment unavailable if more than thirty percent of the sell-
ing price was received in the year of sale. This provision was more
easily violated than might appear because the selling price was
subject to downward adjustment for imputed interest,12 while the
6. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 23.
7. Pub. L No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
8. The determination of what constituted a timely manner turned out to be a
complicated legal issue. The regulations required that election be made in a
timely filed tax return for the year of sale. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(b) (1960).
However, several exceptions to this requirement developed. See Estate of
Lipman v. United States, 376 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1967) (election made in
amended return allowed); Yellow Cab & Car Rental Co. v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. 413 (1974) (election made in late return allowed); Spivey v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 1051 (1963) (election made in later year than that in which first
installment was received allowed).
9. See Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAX L REV. 471, 478-96
(1975). For a particularly egregious example of the potential inequities under
the prior law, see Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953 (1964). In Mitchell the
taxpayer received section 1031 "like-kind" property and boot in exchange for
his property. Boot is cash, securities, or other non-like-kind property which
does not qualify for the non-recognition treatment of section 1031. A taxpayer
under both the prior and present law could elect to treat boot under the in-
stallment method. However, under the prior installment sales provisions, if
the nonrecognition property plus boot which was exchanged for the property
sold had a value of more than 30% of the selling price of the property, the
election was lost. In other words, nonrecognition property was treated as
money received in the year of sale for purposes of section 453. Id. at 965. This
was true even though no gain was recognized on the exchange of the like-
kind property. In Mitchell, the only boot received, other than the installment
note, was approximately $7000 cash, an amount far less than 30% of the sale
price. Nevertheless, treatment of the like-kind property as money received
precluded the taxpayer from using the installment method. Id.
10. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1283 (Ct. CL 1973).
11. See Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 482.
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 772 (1970), affd, 439 F.2d 767 (8th
Cir. 1971) (illustrating the potential effect of imputing interest into a contract
which did not provide for interest). Under section 483, unless interest is spec-
ified in the installment contract at a rate of 9% (simple interest) it will be
imputed at a rate of 10% (compounded semi-annually). The interest is
treated as if it were included in the contract price by the parties as interest,
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calculation of the payment received in the year of sale was not.
After such a reduction in the selling price, the constant year of sale
payment represented a larger percentage of the selling price.
Thus, in situations where the payment received in the year of sale
approached thirty percent of the original sale price, the transaction
was disqualified from installment sales reporting upon downward
adjustment of the sale price.13
In response to the complexity of and general dissatisfaction
with the old installment sales provisions, Congress enacted the In-
stallment Sales Revision Act of 1980.14 While the underlying pur-
pose and operation of the statute were not changed, many of its
shortcomings were corrected.15 The two-payment rule and the
thirty percent initial payment limitation were expunged from the
statute.16 Recognizing that most taxpayers desired the benefits of
installment method treatment, Congress made it automatic.' 7
Under the new law, a taxpayer must elect out of rather than into
the installment provisions.18 The other changes Congress pro-
vided generally simplify the installment provisions and make them
more consistent with other Code provisions and with broader tax
policy.19
and as a result the sale price will be lowered. See LR.C. § 483 (1976). Original
issue discount also is not deemed a part of the actual selling price, and if
present, it will reduce the stated selling price. Temporary Treas. Reg.
§ 15a.453-1(b) (2) (ii), 1981-10 ILR.B. 13. Original issue discount results when a
bond is purchased from the issuing entity at less than its stated face amount.
The difference between the purchase price and the face amount of the bond
is original issue discount, and it is treated as interest for most purposes. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 454, 1232(a) (2)-(3) (1976).
13. The technical nature of the prior installment sales provisions often resulted
in the loss of installment treatment simply because the taxpayer did not ob-
tain good tax planning advice. See Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 474-96.
14. S. REP. No. 1000, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4696, 4697-4701 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
15. Id. at 7-8, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4701-02.
16. See Mylan, The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, 17 WILAETSE L. REV.
303, 304-08 (1981).
17. See Ginsburg, Future Payment Sales After the 1980 Revision Act, 39 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 43.02(4) (1981).
18. SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4706-07.
19. For example, the Act makes sales for future payments which are contingent
in amount eligible for reporting under the installment method; it allows
shareholders who receive installment obligations pursuant to a section 337
corporate liquidation to use the installment method in reporting gain from
payments received on those obligations, if the obligations were procured by
the corporation in furtherance of a section 337 plan of complete liquidation;
and it provides that section 1031 like-kind property is not to be treated as a
payment received in the year of sale in the installment calculation. For a
more extensive discussion of these and other changes made by the 1980 Act,
see Allison & Latham, Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980-Important
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One important issue which has survived the passage of the In-
stallment Sales Revision Act is the necessity of determining
whether and to what extent the taxpayer has received payment in
the year of sale.2 0 Under the prior law, this determination had dual
significance. First, taxable income was calculated as a percent-
age2 ' of payments received in the year of sale. Second, if more
than thirty percent of the adjusted sale price was received in the
year of sale, the transaction was disqualified from installment re-
porting.22 Although the current law has eliminated the thirty per-
cent limitation, taxable income is still calculated as a percentage of
payments received in the year of sale. 23 The determination of the
Changes for the Practitioner, 10 STETSON L. REV. 453 (1981); Colleran & Rosen-
thai, An analysis of the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, 12 TAx ADvi-
SOR 4 (Jan. 1981); Emory & Hjorth, An analysis of the changes made by the
Installment Sales Revision Act of1980-Part I, 54 J. TAx'N 66 (1981); Emory &
Hjorth, Installment Sales Act, Part I" cost recovery, 337 liquidations, related
parties, dispositions, 54 J. TAX'N 130 (1981); Ginsburg, supra note 17; Mylan,
supra note 16.
20. See Emory & Hjorth, An analysis of the changes made by the Installment
Sales Revision Act of 1980-Part 1, 54 J. TAX'N 66, 66-67 (1981).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-5(a) (1958).
22. See Emory & Hjorth, supra note 20, at 66; Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 482 n.41.
23. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (2) (i), 1981-10 I.R.B. 13. See Emory &
Hjorth, supra note 20, at 67; Mylan, supra note 16, at 308. The percentage of
payments treated as income is the gross profit percentage multiplied by the
payments received. Gross profit percentage is defined in the temporary
treasury regulations. See Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (2), 1981-10
I.R.B. 13; supra note 4.
The regulation definition is premised on the belief that a purchaser will
discharge an assumed mortgage. If the premise is correct, the regulation ac-
complishes its purpose of allowing the seller to spread his gain over the pay-
ments he receives. If the sale price were not reduced by the amount of an
assumed mortgage, the gross profit ratio would be too low and the seller
would evade a portion of his tax liability. See Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp.,
288 U.S. 406 (1933). For example, assume A sold B property for $200,000 with a
basis of $100,000 and subject to a mortgage of $100,000. A received $25,000 cash
and a note for $75,000, payable ratably over three years and secured by a sec-
ond mortgage on the property. B paid the mortgagee directly, $25,000 per year
for four years beginning with the year of sale. The gross profit calculation
should be: gross profit of $100,000 divided by the contract price of $100,000
($200,000 selling price minus $100,000 assumed mortgage), yielding a gross
profit ratio of 100%. A should be taxed on the full $25,000 he received each
year ($25,000 x 100%). In contrast, if the contract price were not reduced by
the $100,000 assumed mortgage, the gross profit ratio would be 50%, ($100,000
divided by $200,000) and would be designed to apply to the situation where
the purchaser, B, did not pay the mortgagee directly but rather paid the full
purchase price, $50,000 per year, to the seller. If only $25,000 were in fact
shown on the seller's return, one-half of the gain would escape tax. However,
if $50,000 did pass through the seller's hands and was reported on his tax re-
turn, the 50% gross profit ratio would be correct, and the gain on the sale
would be fully taxed to the seller at the rate of $25,000 per year. The point is
that the mechanics of the statute and its purpose of spreading gain over pay-
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extent of payment in the year of sale may assume even more im-
portance because of the automatic applicability of installment
treatment and the removal of the technical disqualifying provi-
sions. Simplification in these areas will shift tension from techni-
cal disqualification to the more basic issue of the extent of
payment received in the year of sale.24
The stakes involved in receipt of payment situations range from
a progressively greater recognition of income in the year of sale, as
the taxpayer is deemed to have received a larger payment, to the
effective denial of section 453 treatment when the total selling
price is deemed to have been received and recognized in the year
of sale. This Comment will discuss two types of transactions
where the determination of the extent of receipt of payment is im-
portant. The first transaction involves the use of a wraparound
mortgage as security for the seller of real property.25 The second
transaction involves the use of a standby letter of credit to secure
payment for property sold by the seller.2 6 Although both types of
transactions provide the seller of property security against default
by his buyer, the taxation analysis differs in each case. Fundamen-
tal to both analyses, however, is the premise that when the secur-
ity for a transaction becomes too assured, the security will be
treated as the equivalent of an actual payment.
This Comment will outline the probable present status of the
wraparound mortgage and the letter of credit after the Installment
Sales Revision Act of 1980.27 It will also examine temporary regu-
lations 28 promulgated pursuant to the Act which address, to some
extent, both types of transactions. This Comment will discuss
ments received do not depend on whether property is taken subject to a
mortgage, but rather on whether the seller actually receives and reports as
income the yearly payments that it was assumed would be received when the
gross profit ratio was calculated. In the wraparound mortgage situation
where mortgage liability is in excess of basis, this point is of fundamental
importance. See infra notes 56-116 and accompanying text.
24. Under prior law, if the Service felt that an installment transaction should be
taxed more fully in the initial year, there were numerous technicalities which
it could use to attack the validity of the transaction. See supra notes 9-13 &
accompanying text. Removal of the technical provisions will force the Serv-
ice to make a frontal attack on disputed transactions and argue that payment
for the property was actually or constructively received in the year of sale.
25. See infra notes 29-140 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 220-73 and accompanying text.
27. Pub. L No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980). This Comment will discuss only § 453,
which applies to sales of real property and casual (non-dealer) sales of per-
sonal property. Section 453A includes provisions which apply to dealer sales
of personal property. I.R.C. § 453A (Supp. IV 1980). Section 453B contains
rules which govern the taxation of gain on the dispostion of the installment
obligation itself. Id. § 453B.
28. Temporary Treas. Reg. §§ 15a.453-0, .453-1(a)-(e), 1981-10 LR.B. 13-25.
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whether these two security devices can be used without serious
risk of being treated as payments received in the year of sale. To
the extent that the security is treated as a payment rather than as
security, the taxpayer will be forced to recognize income before
actually receiving the proceeds from the sale of the property.
II. WRAPAROUND MORTGAGES AS PAYMENTS RECEIVED
IN THE YEAR OF SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
A. Background
A wraparound mortgage is a type of second mortgage on real
property.29 In the usual wraparound transaction, a property owner
who has previously mortgaged the property resells it, taking in re-
turn a cash down payment and a second mortgage which is
subordinate to that of his (senior) mortgagee.30 The second mort-
gage held by the property owner secures the purchaser's promis-
sory note for the full value of the property, including the portion
which is encumbered by the senior mortgage.31 Contrast this with
the more usual case, where the purchaser gives the seller a note
for value of the seller's equity in the property only, and either as-
sumes the seller's mortgage or refinances the debt embodied in the
seller's mortgage. In the case of a purchase money wraparound
mortgage, the seller of the property remains liable to the senior
mortgagee on the senior mortgage, and the purchaser is in turn
liable to the seller to make payments on the full value of the prop-
erty.32 Each payment from the purchaser to the seller consists of
two parts: a return of the seller's equity in the property and an
amount equal to the debt service that the seller must make on the
senior mortgage.33 The seller is obligated to the purchaser to con-
tinue paying the debt service on the original mortgage to the senior
mortgagee, even though the purchaser now owns and is in posses-
sion of the mortgaged property.34 The seller's larger second mort-
29. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAv 278
(1979).
30. Before the wraparound terminology came into vogue, this method of transfer-
ring mortgaged property was recognized and, therefore, was not "invented"
to circumvent the tax laws. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ennis, 114 Ga. 202,39 S.E. 853
(1901); Hazle v. Bondy, 173 Ill. 302, 50 N.E. 671 (1898); Kinney v. Heuring, 44
Ind. App. 590, 87 N.E. 1053 (1909).
31. G. OsBoRNE, G. NELSON, & D. WurrAN, supra note 29, at 278-79.
32. Id.
33. See Healey, A "New" Security Instrument, 41 CAI ST. B.J. 681 (1966).
34. Id. at 684. The land held by the purchaser serves as a guarantee, while the
original mortgagor has the primary duty, in the capacity of a principal, to dis-
charge the debt. 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 16.125 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
A mortgage may function as security for a personal obligation of the mortga-
gor, if the parties so intend. Id. §§ 16.64-.65. The personal obligation survives
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gage is said to be wrapped around that of the senior mortgagee
because it secures his equity in the property only to the extent
that the value of the property at any given time is greater than the
amount of the senior mortgagee's lien.35 Further, each payment
that the seller receives from the purchaser consists of a payment
for his equity in the property wrapped around the debt service that
he is obligated to make to the senior mortgagee.
This type of financing arrangement has had great utility in the
installment sales transaction because of the potential for deferring
gain on the sale of property which is mortgaged in excess of its
basis.36 To illustrate this potential deferral of income, a discussion
of the mechanics of installment reporting is necessary.
The temporary treasury regulations provide that the tax on an
installment obligation is determined by multiplying the amount re-
ceived in any tax year by the gross profit percentage. 37 The gross
profit percentage is the gross profit to be received from the sale of
the property divided by the contract price.38 The contract price is
the selling price, reduced by any mortgage or encumbrance on the
property which is assumed or taken subject to by the purchaser.
However, the selling price cannot be reduced by more than the ba-
the transfer of the mortgaged property, and the mortgagor (the seller) re-
mains either primarily or secondarily liable, unless his obligation has been
discharged with the consent of the mortgagee. Hakes v. Franke, 210 Iowa
1169, 231 N.W. 1 (1930). The lien on the property, of course, follows the prop-
erty into the hands of the transferee (purchaser) and is the mortgagee's ulti-
mate protection since it may foreclose on the property to satisfy the debt.
However, when the mortgagor transfers mortgaged property, a series of obli-
gations arise which run to the mortgagee and which are layered over the un-
derlying security of the property. 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra,
§§ 16.124-.135. In the wraparound mortgage transaction, the original mortga-
gor agrees to pay off the first mortgage with funds which may be considered
to come from a portion of the purchaser's payment on the wraparound note.
If the mortgagor defaults on this agreement and the mortgagee threatens
foreclosure on the property, the purchaser may redeem the property and
either reduce his remaining obligation to the mortgagor or sue the mortgagor
on a subrogation claim to recover the payments that were wrongfully not paid
to the mortgagee. Id. § 16.146. See Simpson v. Ennis, 114 Ga. 202, 39 S.E. 853
(1901); Hazle v. Bondy, 173 IML 302, 50 N.E. 671 (1898); Hudson v. Dismukes, 77
Va. 242 (1883).
35. See Comment, The Wraparound Mortgage: A Critical Inquiry, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1529, 1530 (1974).
36. An example would be the disposition of property which has been depreciated
on an accelerated method. The basis of the property would be low and part of
the gain on the sale of the property would be ordinary gain because of the
recapture provisions of the Code. See I.R.C. §§ 1250, 1245 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). The use of a wraparound mortgage in the sale transaction would defer
some of the gain from the sale.
37. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (2) (i), 1981-10 LR.B. 13.
38. Id. § 15a.453-1(b) (2) (iii), 19811-10 LR.B. 13.
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sis of the property, even if the purchaser assumes a mortgage in
excess of basis. 39 Accordingly, the temporary regulations provide
that in calculating the contract price, any mortgage assumed or
taken subject to by a purchaser reduces the selling price, but not
by an amount in excess of basis.40
The purpose of the basis limitation is to ensure that the total
profit on the installment sale of property will be taxed and that the
profit will be ratably spread over the actual payments received by
the seller.4 1 The temporary regulations presume that a purchaser
who assumes or takes subject to a mortgage will make direct pay-
ments on the mortgage to the senior mortgagee. As a result, fewer
payments will be channeled through the seller. Therefore, the sell-
ing price must be reduced by the amount to be paid directly to the
senior mortgagee to arrive at a contract price which will accurately
reflect the payments received by the seller.42 Since the gain on the
sale (the numerator of the gross profit percentage) remains the
same in any case, reducing the contract price (the denominator of
the gross profit percentage) due to an assumed mortgage will in-
crease the percentage of each payment which is taxable income.
To avoid a gross profit percentage of more than 100%, which would
result in the seller's payment of tax on more than he actually re-
ceived, the contract price must not be allowed to fall below the
gross profit.43 This situation could arise only when the seller has
mortgaged the property in excess of basis, because only in that
event will part of the seller's profit on the sale be in the form of
debt relief which is paid by the purchaser directly to the
mortgagee.44
The solution to this problem which arises when the purchaser
assumes responsibility for the mortgage debt, is to treat the excess
of the mortgage over basis as if the seller had received it .in the
year of sale.45 Thus, the excess is included in the contract price,
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406 (1933).
42. Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 665 (1955). See Burnet v. S. &
L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406 (1933) (upholding the mechanics of a prior similar
regulation as applied to a sale in which a buyer assumed the seller's
mortgage).
43. Burnet v. S. & L Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406 (1933).
44. The profit on a sale of property is equal to the amount received less the ad-
justed basis of the property. The contract price is basically the amount of
cash paid to the seller. In other words, it is the amount received for the prop-
erty less amounts that are paid to others on the seller's behalf. When the
purchaser assumes a mortgage in excess of basis, the contract price is less
than the profit. Thus, the seller's profit on the sale is more than the cash he
receives for the property.
45. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (i), 1981-10 I.R.B. 14.
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which represents amounts received by the seller.46 The excess is
similarly treated as an actual cash payment to the seller. The re-
sult is the technical definition of contract price: sale price minus
mortgages assumed or taken subject to which are within the
seller's basis. This treatment ensures that the gross profit percent-
age will never be greater than 100% and that all mortgages in ex-
cess of basis which are assumed or taken subject to will represent
taxable income in the year of sale.
Application of these rules to situations in which a purchaser as-
sumes or takes property subject to a mortgage has the following
effects. The contract price is first adjusted downward by the
amount of the mortgage, with the result that a larger percentage of
each payment is treated as income and a lesser percentage as re-
turn of basis. If the assumed mortgage is equal to the property's
basis, the gross profit percentage is 100 and the seller recoups his
basis in the property in the year of sale by the purchaser's assump-
tion of responsibility for the mortgage debt. All additional pay-
ments received in the year of sale and subsequent years are taxed
as income to the seller.47 If the assumed mortgage is in excess of
basis, the seller is relieved of the mortgage debt in the year in
which the purchaser assumes the mortgage, and the excess of the
assumed debt over basis is gain recognized by the seller in that
year.48 Additional payments are also taxed as income to the
seller.4 9
The key to the utility of the wraparound transaction is that the
purchaser does not assume or take the property subject to the first
mortgage.5 0 The purchaser pays the seller the full value of the
property and makes no payments to the seller's mortgagee;5 '
therefore, he does not relieve the seller of the original mortgage
debt on the property. As a result, the contract price equals the
selling price,52 and there is no reduction of the contract price for
the seller's debt relief from mortgages assumed or taken subject to
by the purchaser. More importantly, there will be no gain treated
as if received in the year of sale. This results because there is no
excess of mortgage over basis problem since the purchaser does
not relieve the seller of his debt to the senior mortgagee. An exam-
46. Id. § 15a.453-1(b) (2) (ii), 1981-10 I.R.B. 13.
47. For an example of a transaction involving an assumed mortgage equal to the
basis of the property sold, see supra note 23.
48. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
49. Whenever the gross profit percentage reaches 100%, all payments received by
the seller are income because by definition the seller has already recouped
the basis of the property.
50. See, e.g., Estate of Lamberth v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 302, 315 (1958).
51. See, e.g., Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 668 (1955).
52. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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ple will illustrate the different tax results for the two types of
transactions.
Assume A sells B property for $1,000,000 which has a basis of
$200,000 and is mortgaged to the extent of $500,000. In return for
the property, A receives a cash payment of $100,000 and a four-year
installment promissory note bearing adequate interest for $400,000.
B takes subject to the mortgage and pays the original mortgagee
directly. A's taxable income for the year of sale is calculated as
follows. His gross profit is $800,000 and the contract price is
$800,000 ($1,000,000 selling price minus $200,000 mortgage within ba-
sis). The amount received by A in the year of sale is $400,000
($100,000 cash + $300,000 mortgage in excess of basis). The gross
profit percentage is 100% ($800,000 gross profit divided by $800,000
contract price). A's taxable income from the sale is $400,000 in the
year of sale and $100,000 per year during the four-year discharge of
the note.
If the above transaction were financed through a valid wrap-
around mortgage, where A remained primarily liable on the first
mortgage, the tax result would be as follows. The gross profit
would remain $800,000. The contract price, however, would be
$1,000,000 because B would not assume or take subject to the mort-
gage. B would remit $200,000 to A in the year of sale and give A a
promissory note for $800,000 to be paid $200,000 per year for four
years. A would pay off the first mortgage at the rate of $100,000 per
year. The gross profit percentage would equal eighty percent
($800,000 gross profit divided by $1,000,000 contract price) and the
amount received in the year of sale would be $200,000. A's taxable
income from the sale would be $160,000 in the year of sale and
$160,000 per year during the four-year discharge of the note.
The wraparound mortgage financing in the above example
would defer $240,000 of income from the year of sale and spread it
evenly over the remaining term of the second mortgage and prom-
issory note. This result is obtained because the excess of the first
mortgage over the basis in the property is not treated as a payment
received in the year of sale.
The essence of the wraparound transaction is that the original
mortgagor remains primarily liable on the first mortgage,5 3 the pur-
chaser of the property does not assume or take subject to the mort-
gage,54 and all payments are remitted to the seller and reported as
payments received on the wraparound indebtedness.55 This justi-
fies the delay in recognizing income and spreads the seller's gain
53. See infra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 61:499
INSTALLMENT SALES
over the payments he receives from the sale of the property in ac-
cord with the ultimate purpose of section 453.
In the temporary section 453 regulations, the Internal Revenue
Service has taken the position that any purported wraparound
mortgage transaction will be ignored, regardless of whether the
seller remains primarily liable thereon, and the purchaser will be
deemed to have taken the property subject to the mortgage.56 This
will effectively deny the seller the benefits of the wraparound
mortgage.
Prior to the promulgation of the regulations, the Tax Court had,
through a series of opinions, defined the parameters of a valid
wraparound transaction. 7 Although the requirements were strin-
gent, taxpayers could qualify for wraparound mortgage treatment
if economically real transactions were involved.5 8 The Tax Court's
position with regard to wraparound transactions seems to comport
with economic reality and the purpose of installment sales report-
ing.59 In contrast, the temporary regulations appear to represent a
draconian attitude that because in the large majority of transac-
tions the purchaser will in fact assume or take the property subject
to the mortgage, all transactions involving the sale of mortgaged
property should be so treated, regardless of economic reality.
The remainder of this section of the Comment will outline the
parameters of a valid wraparound mortgage as defined by the Tax
Court and compare them to the apparent position of the Service.
B. Parameters of a Valid Wraparound Mortgage and the Purpose of
Section 453
Since the inception of the wraparound mortgage cases,60 the
Tax Court has attempted to define the indicia of a valid wrapped
mortgage by examining the obligations created between the origi-
56. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (ii), 1981-10 LR.B. 14-15.
57. Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1975),
affd, 613 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1980); Hutchison v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1089
(1981); Goodman v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 684 (1980); Voight v. Commis-
sioner, 68 T.C. 99 (1977); Waldrep v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 640 (1969), affdper
curiam, 428 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1970); United Pac. Corp. v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 721 (1963); Estate of Lamberth v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 302 (1958);
Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659 (1955).
58. See infra notes 67-95 and accompanying text.
59. The purpose of § 453 is to spread the gain from a sale of property over the
period during which the installment payments of the sale price are received.
Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948); SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 7-8, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4701-03.
60. Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659 (1955), is considered to be the
seminal case in this area.
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nal mortgagor, his purchaser, and the mortgagee. 61 The Tax Court
described this approach as follows:
While in a sense every sale of mortgaged property is subject to a mortgage
since the property remains liable to have the mortgage debt satisfied from
it, we think the expression [assuming or taking property subject to a mort-
gage] was used in the regulation in its customary meaning, to define the
obligations of the parties to a sale of property with respect to the mortgage
debt.62
This focus on the parties' obligations to one another strikes at the
core of the purpose of section 453, which is to spread a seller's gain
over the actual payments he receives for the property.63 Although
the mortgagee's overriding security in the property is always pres-
ent, the "secondary" personal obligations of the parties define the
flow of cash from the purchaser to the original mortgagor, and ulti-
mately to the mortgagee. Since section 453 is an income-timing de-
vice,64 which was designed to operate on the basis of the flow of
cash payments to a seller, this "obligations" analysis comports
with the purposes of section 453.
Assume the typical wraparound financing situation in which
three parties are involved-the seller of mortgaged property, the
purchaser, and the mortgagee. The seller is the pivotal character
in the transaction and is involved in agreements with both the pur-
chaser and the senior mortgagee. The purchaser agrees to make
payments to the seller on the second mortgage. From the pur-
chaser's perspective, the seller is the sole mortgagee of the prop-
erty, and the purchaser pays the seller for the full value of the
property. Nevertheless, the senior mortgagee retains the first
mortgage on the property. To protect his quiet possession of the
property, the purchaser will require the seller to agree to continue
to pay the senior mortgagee, even though the seller no longer pos-
sesses the property. The seller will remain primarily responsible
to the senior mortgagee for the discharge of the first mortgage on
the property. In one sense then, the seller will agree to route pay-
ments from the ultimate purchaser to the senior mortgagee.
Predictably, the Internal Revenue Service has attacked this
61. See Levinton, Use of wrap-around mortgages can expand installment sales
despite IRS opposition, 51 J. TAX'N 166 (1979).
62. Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 668 (1955).
63. See, e.g., Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948); Pren-
dergast v. Commissioner, 22 B.T-.A 1259, 1262 (1931); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 14, at 7, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4701-02. Since at least 1928,
the Tax Court has focused primarily on an evaluation of the obligations and
payments made among the parties in analyzing transactions involving mort-
gage assumptions. See Pacheco Creek Orchard Co. v. Commissioner, 12
B.TA.. 1358 (1928).
64. Section 453 does not affect the amount of gain realized on a transaction but
rather the time at which it is recognized. See Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 475.
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transaction.65 It has asserted that the purchaser has relieved the
seller of the senior mortgage debt and, if the debt is in excess of
basis, that the excess is income which must be recognized by the
seller in the year of sale. Although the old regulations were neu-
tral on the subject, the temporary regulations adopt the position
that all mortgages are assumed when encumbered property is
sold.66
The Tax Court began delineating its position regarding wrap-
around mortgage financing by allowing its benefits to a seller of
property who could demonstrate a binding obligation which left
him primarily liable67 to his senior mortgagee and which required
that payments on the first mortgage would flow from the purchaser
through the seller to the mortgagee. 68 The taxpayer-seller had to
demonstrate that he was not relieved of the mortgage debt in the
year of sale.69 Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner70 was the initial
case in which the distinctive features of wraparound-type 7' financ-
65. For a list of the major cases in which the Service has litigated the validity of
wraparound financing, see supra note 57.
66. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958) (wraparound mortgage transactions
are not explicitly addressed) with Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-
1(b) (3) (ii), 1981-10 IREB. 14-15 (purchaser is always deemed to have assumed
the mortgage or to have taken the property subject to it).
67. Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 663 (1955).
68. Id. at 667-68.
69. Id. at 669.
70. 24 T.C. 659 (1955). The Stonecrest Corporation was in the business of build-
ing homes and obtained initial financing by mortgaging each home and its
accompanying lot. When a home was sold, a two-part payment schedule was
adopted. Under the first part, the purchaser's payments equaled Stonecrest's
payments on the first mortgage and an additional amount which returned
Stonecrest's equity in the property. Under the second-part, payments began
when Stonecrest's equity had been redeemed and equaled the amount of
payments made on the first mortgage. Purchasers could pay the remaining
balance on the contract after a period which ranged from five to eight years.
Title to the property passed only upon payment of the total selling price. Id.
at 662.
71. The Stonecrest case, as well as the majority of the cases cited in note 57
supra, involved a contract for deed, or an installment land contract, rather
than a wraparound mortgage. For tax purposes, the two should be treated
identically because they are simply two different forms of a security device.
The obligations of the parties inter se regarding payments on the mortgage
are the same in either case. Levinton, supra note 61, at 169. The Tax Court
recently declined to decide whether wraparound mortgages should be
treated the same for tax purposes as installment land contracts. Goodman v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 684, 712 & n.16 (1980). However, the resolution of that
issue was not necessary for its decision in Goodman. In prior cases, the Tax
Court held that the location of legal title was not relevant to the issue of
whether a mortgage had been assumed. Voight v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 99
(1977); Estate of Lamberth v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 302 (1958). Location of
legal title is one difference between a mortgage and an installment land con-
tract transaction. See infra note 90.
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ing were recognized. In Stonecrest, the court determined that the
issues of the availability of installment reporting and the treat-
ment of the excess of mortgage over basis as a payment received in
the year of sale depended upon the meaning of taking subject to or
assuming a mortgage. 72 In seeking these meanings, the court was
aware that its ultimate judicial goal was to apply section 453 con-
sistently with its purpose.73
The court first found that a mortgage was assumed when the
purchaser paid the seller for its redemption interest and promised
the seller to pay off the mortgage debt.74 Thus, in effect, the pur-
chaser became primarily liable to the senior mortgagee, since the
mortgagee could ordinarily enforce the purchaser's promise to the
seller75 on a third-party beneficiary theory76 or subrogation
claim.77 The court then identified three factors which weighed
against finding that the purchaser had assumed the mortgage.
First, the purchaser made all payments to the seller, leaving the
seller to pay the senior debt service.78 Second, there was no syn-
72. 24 T.C. at 666.
73. Id. at 668. The court noted that the Commissioner's view would apply the
"assumed" or "taken subject to" language to all sales of mortgaged property,
effectively negating the utility of the terms in the regulation. Id. The pres-
ence of the terms in the regulation imply that some sales of mortgaged prop-
erty are not subject to the mortgage.
74. Id. at 666 (citing 5 Tiffany, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, §§ 1435, 1436 (3d ed.
1939); 4 AmERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 16.125, 16.127, 16.128-.132 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952)).
75. 24 T.C. at 666.
76. See, e.g., Evans v. Sperry, 12 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Becker v. Nelson, 164
Minn. 367, 205 N.W. 262 (1925); G. OssoRNE, G. NELSON, & D. WHrr.AsN, supra
note 29, at 269-70. This theory is based on the premise that a contract be-
tween the purchaser and the seller can create an independent enforceable
right in the mortgagee because the assumption contract was intended to ben-
efit the mortgagee. Id.
77. See, e.g., Keller v. Ashford, 133 U.S. 610 (1890). Unlike a claim under a third-
party beneficiary theory, a subrogation claim is a derivative cause of action.
The purchaser of the property would promise to indemnify the seller if he
were forced to pay the mortgagee because of the purchaser's default on his
principal obligation to pay the mortgagee the debt service on the assumed
mortgage. The mortgagee would be subrogated to the rights, or stand in the
shoes, of the seller and thus could sue the purchaser on the seller's indem-
nity claim against the purchaser. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, & D. WHwmA,
supra note 29, at 271-73.
78. 24 T.C. at 662-63. In Stonecrest, title did not pass from the seller to the pur-
chaser until the purchaser either paid off both the first and second mortgages
or formally assumed the senior mortgage and paid the seller his equity (the
value of the second mortgage). Apparently, the court was not overly con-
cerned with the formal passage of title. Instead the court focused on who was
primarily liable on the first mortgage debt. The court stated: "Even if title
had passed before complete performance . . . petitioner would have re-
mained primarily liable to the bank .... " Id. at 662.
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chronization between the seller's collection of payments from the
purchaser and its payment of the senior debt to the mortgagee.7 9
Finally, the mortgagee continued to carry the seller as the debtor
on its records, indicating that that seller bore the primary respon-
sibility for payment of the debt.80
The court found that property was taken subject to a mortgage
where there was no valid personal primary obligation on either the
purchaser or the seller-mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt.81
However, because the purchaser would have paid the seller for his
equity in the property, i.e., the redemption interest, there would be
an implicit understanding that the purchaser would pay the mort-
gage debt to avoid foreclosure on the property which he pos-
79. Id. at 663. The lack of synchronization made it less likely that Stonecrest was
the agent of the purchaser and making payments on its behalf.
80. Stonecrest in fact had an option, which was not exercised, to require a com-
plete release rather than a mere assumption of its liability on the mortgage
before title passed. Id. at 667. A mortgagor remains secondarily liable on an
assumed mortgage but is absolved of liability if a release is executed. Under
prior law, a total release from liability was treated as a payment in the year of
sale, even if the mortgagor was released from a mortgage debt within his ba-
sis. Taxpayers who had been released from liability on a mortgage which was
within basis had attempted to argue that the release was the equivalent of an
assumption, and thus they were not required to include the amount of the
release as income because it was within basis. However, if the taxpayer did
not remain secondarily liable, the Tax Court found that he had been released,
and the amount of the released mortgage was considered as a payment re-
ceived in the year of sale. See Muller v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 719 (1979);
Maddox v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 854 (1978). See also Rev. Rul. 71-515, 1971-2
C.B. 222 (when the mortgagee is the purchaser, there is a cancellation of the
debt, or a merger of the fee and the mortgage, and the cancellation is treated
as a payment in the year of sale, by analogy to the release). The Installment
Sales Revision Act temporary regulations change this result. A novation (the
formal release of a party with the concurrent replacement of that party with
another) or a release of a mortgagor is treated the same as an assumption. If
the mortgage debt released is within basis, no amount is treated as a pay-
ment received in the year of sale. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15.a-453-
1(b) (3) (i), 1981-10 IR.B. 14. Novation of a mortgage within basis results in an
economic benefit to the taxpayer equal to the amount of debt relief, but since
he has already paid tax on this amount, it would be inappropriate to spread
his gain over the debt-relief payment.
81. 24 T.C. at 666. The seller remains liable to the mortgagee and although the "
agreement between the mortgagor-seller and the purchaser may stipulate
that the land will serve as the primary source from which payment will be
made to the mortgagee through a potential foreclosure sale, the mortgagee
may not, in some jurisdictions, be forced to foreclose on the property to col-
lect the debt. He may proceed against the mortgagor-seller notwithstanding
the seller-purchaser agreement to the contrary. The seller, however, will be
able to cause the purchaser to exhaust the land in payment of the debt, or if
he pays the debt himself, he can recover the amount from the purchaser
through a foreclosure sale. See 4 AmERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 34,
§ 16.127.
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sessed82 and to protect his cash outlay.83
In Stonecrest, the court determined that the parties' agreement
expressly provided that the seller would make payments on the
mortgage debt until the conveyance of the property, and that the
agreement was enforceable between the parties. 84 Additionally,
the court noted that the purchaser clearly paid the seller the full
sale price, rather than its lesser redemption interest, which indi-
cated that the property was not taken subject to the mortgage.85
Finding that the purchaser had not assumed or taken subject to
the mortgage, the court held that the amount of the mortgage on
the property which exceeded the seller's basis should not be
treated as a payment received in the year of sale.86 Thus the court
rejected the Commissioner's claim that more taxable income
should have been recognized in the year of sale.8 7
It should be noted that the Stonecrest case, as well as several
others in this area,88 involved the use of an installment land con-
tract, also called a contract for deed, as the security device. This
instrument is analogous to the wraparound purchase money mort-
gage 89 and, for tax purposes, is its equivalent.9 0 The obligations
between the parties which define the flow of money from pur-
82. 24 T.C. at 666.
83. Id. at 667.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 668. This fact, together with the lack of synchronization of payments
and the seller's primary liability to the mortgagee, made the sale economi-
cally real.
86. Id. at 669.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 57.
89. See J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS §§ 3.58-.81
(1970). Hetland observed: 'Though complete equation still seems a few
years away, when the land contract is absorbed into the security system
.... it will make little difference that technically it is a contract; practically
and remedially it will be a purchase-money mortgage." Id. § 3.81. See gener-
ally J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1974).
90. The most significant differences between a purchase money mortgage
wrapped around an existing mortgage and an installment land contract may
be the remedies available against the defaulting purchaser. Comment, In-
stallment Land Contracts: Remedies in Nebraska, 60 NEB. L. REv. 750, 755
(1981). In a lien .state, title to the property passes to the purchaser when a
mortgage is used to secure the purchase price. In contrast, title remains with
the seller when property is sold pursuant to a land contract. However, the
remedies available to the seller to enforce his security are governed by the
underlying equitable interests in the property in both the mortgage and land
contract situations. Id. at 753. Section 453 is concerned with the manner in
which payments are made between the parties. These payment procedures
can be defined with equal efficacy in either the mortgage or the installment
land contract.
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chaser to seller to mortgagee are the same in each type of
transaction.
There are numerous variations of the wraparound-type financ-
ing situation involved in Stonecrest. Subsequent Tax Court opin-
ions reveal which of these variations are permissible and which
will result in losing the benefits of wraparound financing.
In United Pacific Corp. v. Commissioner,91 the court found that
the purchaser's assumption of the senior mortgage in the sixth
year after the sale of the property did not preclude wraparound
treatment for the seller during the five-year period in which the
seller was primarily liable to the mortgagee.92 The agreement be-
tween the purchaser and the seller contemplated the formal as-
sumption of the mortgage in the sixth year.93 Accordingly, the
court allowed the seller to recognize gain ratably as payments
were actually received over the five-year interim and to recognize
the "balloon" payment in the sixth year when the mortgage was
formally assumed.94
The court explained that its conclusion was shaped by a desire
to further the purpose of section 453:
[P] etitioner reported the full profit of $991,240 on the sale over the 5-year
91. 39 T.C. 721 (1963). United Pacific involved the sale of a commercial building
pursuant to a contract for deed in which the purchaser made payments to the
seller over a five-year period. In the sixth year, the purchaser paid United
Pacific its remaining equity interest, took title to the property, and assumed
the remaining mortgage. United Pacific was carried as the primary obligor on
the mortgagee's records until the purchaser assumed the mortgage. The pay-
ment schedule and other relevant figures in the transaction were: gross sale
price-$1,706,000; net sale price--$1,703,722.75; basis of property-712,482.75;
gain-$991,240. The gross profit percentage was $991,240 divided by $1,706,000
(the sale price was not reduced by any mortgage because of the wraparound
feature) or 58%. United Pacific reported income as follows (rounded):
(A) Amount paid under (B) Profit
contract (58% of Col. (A))
1955 $ 206,000 $119,692
1956 79,835 46,386
1957 45,269 26,302
1958 67,919 39,463
1959 91,341 53,072
1960 1,215,634 706,322
The excess of mortgage over basis was $537,517.25. The Commissioner sought
to have this excess treated as a payment in 1955, making the total payments
$743,517, compared to the $206,000 United Pacific reported. As a result, the
taxpayer would have been disqualified from using installment reporting be-
cause of the 30% rule.
The final payment of $1,215,634 represents the redemption of the seller's
equity and the assumption of the mortgage by the purchaser.
92. 39 T.C. at 723-24.
93. Id. at 724.
94. Id. at 728. See supra note 91 for the payment schedule used by the parties.
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period .... We cannot see how the interpretation given to the regulation
in the Stonecrest case fails to give effect to the purpose of section 453,
which is to enable a seller to distribute the profit on an installment sale
over the years in which he actually received payments of the purchase
price. In fact, respondent's interpretation would appear to be contrary to
the statutory purpose, since in this case it would mean that petitioner's
entire profit of $991,240... would be taxable in the year of sale, when
petitioner received a cash payment of $206,000 .... 95
The importance of the agreement between the parties can be
illustrated by comparing the United Pacific case with Estate of
Lamberth v. Commissioner.96 In Lamberth, the parties did not pro-
vide for a formal assumption of the mortgage by the purchaser.97
However, the seller's equity in the property was to be completely
paid off during the initial ten years of a fourteen-year installment
contract, and title to the property was to pass to the purchaser in
the tenth year.98 Nevertheless, the seller's mortgage payments to
the senior mortgagee were to run for fourteen years, four years
longer than the land contract. With the land contract terminated
and title in his possession, the purchaser would pay, on behalf of
the seller, the remaining senior mortgage balance directly to the
mortgagee in the tenth year to protect his property.99
For tax purposes, the agreement between the parties was inter-
preted as anticipating, at the time of sale,O9 that the purchaser
would take the property subject to the mortgage balance.101 Thus,
the selling price was reduced by the amount of the mortgage bal-
ance remaining after ten years to arrive at the contract price. This
increased the gross profit percentage and spread the gain repre-
sented by the mortgage balance over the payments that the seller
would actually receive during the ten year contract term.102 Pre-
sumably, if the parties had provided for a formal assumption of the
mortgage in the tenth year, the seller could have deferred recogni-
tion of the gain from the assumption until the tenth year under the
rationale of the United Pacific case. Therefore, providing for a for-
95. 39 T.C. at 727-28.
96. 31 T.C. 302 (1958).
97. Id. at 316.
98. Id.
99. Id. This was a presumption by the court based on all the evidence before it.
100. The location of title was not treated as a relevant consideration in this case.
The purchaser was considered to have assumed or taken the property subject
to the remaining mortgage balance as of the time of sale. If the equivalent of
a mortgage assumption may be found without the passing of title, a corollary
would seem to be that the passing of title cannot be the sine qua non of an
assumption or taking subject to a mortgage as the Service is apparently now
contending. See Priv. Let. Rul. 7814011 (Dec. 29, 1977); Priv. Let. Rul 7814010
(Dec. 23, 1977); Levinton, supra note 61, at 170.
101. 31 T.C. at 316. -
102. Id. at 316-17.
[Vol. 61:499
INSTALLMENT SALES
mal assumption of a mortgage may enable deferred recognition of
income that would otherwise be recognized earlier.
As in other tax areas, the courts look to the substance of a
transaction, not its form, in determining whether it qualifies for
section 453 treatment. 0 3 When it appears that the purchaser has
become a party to the mortgage contract between the seller-mort-
gagor and the mortgagee so that the mortgagee can directly en-
force the obligation against the purchaser, an assumption of the
mortgage will be found, regardless of what the parties expressly
provided in their agreement.104 In such a situation, the seller-
mortgagor is no longer the nexus between the purchaser and the
mortgagee since the purchaser will probably seek to satisfy the
mortgage debt by directly paying the mortgagee to avoid the risk of
the seller's mishandling of the funds. The purchaser's direct pay-
ment of the mortgage debt will vitiate the wraparound transaction
by relieving the mortgagor of his mortgage debt in the year of the
sale. Specifically, the purchaser's assumption of the primary re-
sponsibility on the mortgage debt relieves the seller of a personal
liability, which justifies treating the excess of the mortgage over
basis as a payment received in the year of sale.105
There are several other situations in which the benefits of
financing a property sale with a wraparound mortgage will be lost
because of the application of the substance-over-form analysis.
For example, in Voight v. Commissioner,0 6 the purchaser and the
senior mortgagee were anxious to assure that the purchaser's pay-
ments which were targeted to pay off the senior mortgage actually
found their way through the seller's hands to the mortgagee. 0 7 To
assuage the parties' anxieties, the installment contract contained
an option which provided that the purchaser could pay the mortga-
gee directly and, that in such event, the payments were to be
deemed made on the contract on the seller's behalf.108 Addition-
ally, the mortgagee required the purchaser and the seller to jointly
103. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Hindes v.
United States, 326 F.2d 150, 151 (5th Cir. 1964).
104. See, e.g., Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900, 910
(E.D. La. 1975), affid, 613 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1980); Voight v. Commissioner,
68 T.C. 99, 113-14 (1977); Waldrep v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 640, 645-46 (1969).
This substantive analysis has been viewed as being too definitional, and
therefore superficial. Comment, supra note 35, at 1552-57. However, the Tax
Court has attempted to determine the significance of assuming a mortgage or
taking subject to it by looking at the substance of the transaction and the
purpose of section 453.
105. The cases dealing with wraparound mortgages equate debt relief with direct
payment between purchaser and mortgagee. See supra note 57.
106. 68 T.C. 99 (1977).
107. Id. at 113.
108. Id. at 102.
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execute a mortgage loan amendment in which the purchaser abso-
lutely guaranteed payment of the first mortgage. 0 9
The Tax Court found that the guarantee was tantamount to an
assumption because the mortgagee could enforce the loan amend-
ment by directly suing the purchaser, a party to the amendment,
without first attempting to collect from the seller.n0 Although the
seller was jointly liable with the purchaser, the seller's loss of sta-
tus as the sole primary obligor on the mortgage was sufficient for
the court to find an assumption."'
In addition, the court found that the parties intended that the
purchaser make payments to the senior mortgagee, thereby dis-
charging the seller's debt.112 The intention was manifested by:
(1) the absolute "direct liability" guarantee, (2) the option al-
lowing such direct payment, and (3) the actual course of dealing
between the parties under which the purchaser paid the
mortgagee." 3
Another variation which will not withstand the court's calculus
for analyzing wraparound-type transactions occurs when the pur-
chaser accepts personal liability on a new mortgage encumbering
property previously mortgaged by the seller." 4 Taxpayers would
most likely attempt this type of financing when a real estate subdi-
vision is involved. For example, a large tract of land may be
financed and, after it appreciates in value, subdivided for resale.
Assume that the mortgagee agrees to release a parcel of land from
its encumbrance and shift the amount released to the encum-
brance on the remaining appreciated land owned by the seller.
The purchaser of the parcel of property then gives the seller a note
and a mortgage for the value of the seller's equity in the prop-
erty.115 The purchaser also gives the mortgagee a note and a new
mortgage equivalent to the one released.116
This transaction will be treated as an assumption of the original
mortgage by the purchaser despite the technical release and crea-
tion of a new mortgage.117 It will not avail the seller to argue that
he has not been released from the debt because the released
amount was added to the encumbrance on the rest of the land he
owns. The purchaser will be deemed the primary obligor on the
109. Id. at 103.
110. Id. at 113 (citing Swift & Co. v. Geraghty, 199 Wis. 329, 226 N.W. 381 (1929);
United States v. Klebe Tool & Die Co., 5 Wis. 2d 392, 92 N.W.2d 868 (1958)).
111. 68 T.C. at 113 n.7.
112. Id. at 113.
113. Id.
114. See Waldrep v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 640 (1969).
115. See id. at 642. The situation described in the text tracks the Tacts of. Wa4drep.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 646.
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portion of the senior mortgage which was released, and, if the debt
is in excess of the basis of the parcel of property, the seller will
recognize gain on the creation of the new mortgage.118
An attractive variation of a wraparound financing transaction
might be to provide for a trust or an agent to collect proceeds from
the purchaser and remit the appropriate portion of each payment
to the seller and the senior mortgagee." 9 This structure would
provide a measure of security to all parties while not straying too
far from the fundamental character of a wraparound transaction.
However, the Tax Court's decision in Goodman v. Commissionerl20
has precluded the use of a trust or an agent for collection and dis-
tribution of payments in a wraparound transaction, at least in
some circumstances.
In Goodman, the parties chose a bank to act as an agent for the
collection of the purchaser's payments.12 1 Ostensibly, the bank
was only the seller's agent and was to collect payments on its be-
half. However, the bank was contractually bound to the purchaser
to route the debt service to the senior mortgagee. The court found
that the bank was a collection agent for both the seller and the
mortgagee and a distribution agent for the purchaser.122 As a re-
sult of the contractual collection and distribution structure, the
purchaser's payments did not actually pass into and out of the
seller's general funds.123 The seller's independent obligation to
the mortgagee to pay debt service was rendered meaningless by
the agent's obligation to the purchaser to route the payments to
the mortgagee without first allowing them to come under the
seller's control.124 From the day the collecting bank became obli-
118. Id.
119. See Comment, supra note 35, at 1552.
120. 74 T.C. 684 (1980). The seller in Goodman took a purchase money wrap-
around mortgage to secure the installment note. Id. at 692.
121. Id. at 714. In Goodman, a partnership sold property to a trust, whose benefi-
ciaries were the partners' children. The property was mortgaged in excess of
basis, and the trust sold the property to a third party. The partnership osten-
sibly remained liable on the mortgage encumbering the property, and the
third party was to pay the trust, which in turn would remit the payments to
the partnership for final transfer to the mortgagee. However, a clause in the
note given in payment by the third party set forth a collection agreement
whereby a banking institution would act as agent for the trust and the part-
nership. The bank was to collect the installments made by the purchaser and
route the appropriate amounts to the mortgagee and the trust. The trust
would then pay the part of each payment owed the partnership and retain the
remainder for investment. Significantly, the bank was obligated to the pur-
chaser by contract to pay the required portion of the total payment to the
mortgagee.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 713.
124. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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gated to collect the purchaser's payments and route them to the
mortgagee, the seller was relieved of the primary duty to pay the
mortgagee.125 Similarly, the purchaser was relieved of the risk of
relying on the seller to make the required mortgage payments.
The Goodman court did not find that the purchaser had as-
sumed the mortgage because there was no agreement between the
mortgagee and the purchaser, nor was there an option allowing di-
rect payment from the purchaser to the mortgagee.126 However,
the court noted that under the collection arrangement, only the re-
demption interest was actually being paid to the seller. Payment
of only the redemption interest to a seller of property is a primary
indicator that the purchaser has taken the property subject to a
mortgage, and this was the ultimate finding of the court.12 7 As with
a mortgage assumption, selling property subject to a mortgage re-
lieves the mortgagor-seller of the mortgage debt. The purchaser's
taking subject to the mortgage and the mortgagor's debt relief
were illustrated in Goodman by the purchaser's use of the bank as
a collecting agent to ensure that its payments were made to the
mortgagee. 128 Since the mortgage debt was treated as relieved in
the year that the property was transferred to the purchaser, the
amount of the mortgage in excess of basis was treated as an
amount received by the seller in that year.129
125. See Comment, supra note 35, at 1552, which the court cited in its analysis of
the transaction. 74 T.C. at 714.
126. 74 T.C. at 713.
127. Id. at 714. It should be apparent that the assumption of a mortgage or taking
property subject to a mortgage is only detrimental when the mortgage is in
excess of basis. When the mortgage is within basis, taxpayers have an incen-
tive to attempt to mortgage their property in anticipation of sale and have the
buyer take subject to the mortgage. This would allow a realization of cash
from the property while deferring recognition of gain until payments were
received on the installment obligation. Borrowing on property in anticipation
of its sale for this purpose will result in sham treatment of the mortgage debt,
and the assumption will be treated as an amount received in the year of sale.
If the borrowing is bona fide and not in anticipation of sale, deferral of recog-
nition is allowed. Turner v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 74,264 (1974);
Denco Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 8 (1962).
128. 74 T.C. at 713-14.
129. Id. at 714. Some earlier cases indicated that the purchaser's payment of lia-
bilities other than a mortgage on the property in the year of sale would be
treated as a payment received in the year of sale even if the amounts paid
were within the taxpayer's basis. Thus a distinction was drawn between
mortgage assumption and discharge of other liabilities generated in the busi-
ness in which the property was used. Wagegro Corp. v. Commissioner, 38
B.T.A. 1225 (1938); Batcheller v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1050 (1930). In later
cases, the courts have found that payment of liabilities generated in the
course of a business associated with the property should be treated the same
as an assumption of a mortgage, i.e., no payment is deemed received in the
year of sale unless the amount of liability assumed exceeds the seller's basis
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It is thus apparent that wraparound treatment will be pre-
cluded in a transaction where the trust or agent is contractually
bound to collect and distribute the purchaser's payments and the
payments do not pass into the seller's control and become com-
mingled with his general funds before payment is made to the
mortgagee. Since the only apparent purpose of using the trust or
agent is to avoid the risk of the seller's mishandling of the pur-
chaser's funds, the Goodman case removes the incentive for using
either device in a wraparound transaction.
To the extent that any principles can be distilled from the Tax
Court's treatment of wraparound financing transactions, it would
appear that a valid wraparound transaction must leave the pur-
chaser and the senior mortgagee isolated from each other. The
purchaser must not become primarily liable on the seller's debt by
way of any agreement or guarantee with the mortgagee, and the
mortgage payments must be made only through the seller to the
mortgagee. 3 0 The sales contract should not provide the purchaser
with an option to directly pay the mortgagee.131 No trust or agency
collection system should be attempted, and the purchaser's pay-
ments should come under the seller's control before they are re-
mitted to the mortgagee.132 Although the seller may serve as a
conduit for payments from the purchaser to the mortgagee, eco-
nomic reality is demonstrated by a lack of synchronization133 be-
tween the purchaser's payments to the seller and the seller's
payments to the mortgagee. A lack of synchronization allows time
for the payments to commingle with the seller's funds and be sub-
ject to his full control. This gives substance to the seller's in-
dependent obligation to the mortgagee by placing a risk on the
purchaser that he may be forced to vindicate his right to have the
seller pay the mortgage by suing the seller on the contract be-
tween them.
In addition to the previously discussed variations of the wrap-
around transaction which should be avoided by taxpayers, men-
tion should be made of two peripheral matters. First, the taxpayer
should avoid using a controlled entity to act as the purchaser of
property from himself as seller of the property.134 In such a case,
in the property. Irwin v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1968); Marshall v.
United States, 241 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Cal. 1964), affid, 357 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.
1966). The temporary regulations adopt the position of the later cases. See
Temporary Treas. Reg. § l5a.453-1(b) (2) (iv), 1981-10 LIRB. 13-14.
130. See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
134. See Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La.
1975), affd, 613 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1980). In Republic, the taxpayer sold prop-
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the taxpayer's control of the purchaser-entity makes it possible for
him to cause the purchaser to assume the mortgage at any conve-
nient time.135 Maintaining a position on both sides of the transac-
tion creates the potential for abuse, and, as a result, the
transaction will be deemed to lack economic reality and will be re-
fused recognition as a valid wraparound transaction. 136
Second, when a taxpayer initially has achieved a valid wrap-
around transaction, he should be wary of any modifications to the
agreement which could detrimentally affect the tax consequences.
For example, in any case where the seller receives a premature
redemption of his equity in the property, it will appear as if he can
walk away from the transaction and leave the purchaser to pay the
mortgagee.137 This result becomes especially likely when the
erty to a corporation of which he was the majority shareholder and the ulti-
mate decision-maker. The original sale agreement provided that Republic
would assume the mortgage, but in a subsequent letter, in effect from the
taxpayer, acting for Republic, to himself, the corporation manifested its in-
tention to give the taxpayer a note for the full purchase price, including the
value of the mortgage. The taxpayer was to remit the necessary mortgage
payments to the mortgagee. Republic's corporate records indicated that pay-
ments to the taxpayer were to reimburse him for discharging the corpora-
tion's loan, and that Republic had the option to accelerate full payment on
the note at any time. Accelerating payment on the note would require the
corporation to assume the mortgage and, since the taxpayer controlled the
corporation, he was in effect able to cause, at will, the corporation's assump-
tion of the mortgage. Not only did the corporation merely pass payment to
the mortgagee through its principal shareholder, but the ability of the tax-
payer-principal shareholder to accelerate payment on the note and force as-
sumption of the mortgage indicated that he was able to manipulate the
transaction for his own tax benefit. Regardless of the nominal description of
the transaction in the subsequent sham letter, the taxpayer was clearly act-
ing in a corporate capacity when payments were made to the mortgagee. The
court would not allow this disregard for economic reality and found that the
corporation had in fact assumed the mortgage in the year of sale. 397 F. Supp.
at 910-11.
135. See Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La.
1975), aftd, 613 F.2d 518, 520 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980). The taxpayer, through his
control of Republic could cause the corporation to prepay the note at any
time. In effect he held a demand note in his individual capacity and the cor-
poration had to stand ready to assume the mortgage. The taxpayer was
found to have constructively received an assumption of the mortgage in the
year of sale. 613 F.2d at 522-23.
136. 613 F.2d at 524.
137. See Hutchison v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1089 (1981). Hutchison involved a
purchaser who defaulted on payments on the wrap around mortgage. A court
had required the purchaser to make payments to the seller and his mortga-
gee separately. Id. at 1090. After the court terminated its supervision of the
situation, the purchaser redeemed the seller of his interest in the property
pursuant to a settlement. No specific agreement as to the payment of the
mortgagee was reached. Id. at 1091. Payments were in fact made directly to
the mortgagee by the purchaser after the settlement agreement. The Tax
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mortgagee reflects in its records that the primary obligor has
changed.138 The seller, having received all his equity from the
property, will appear to cease having an interest in the transaction
and leave the property to satisfy the senior mortgage.139 The pur-
chaser in such a case will be treated as taking the property subject
to the mortgage because he will pay the mortgage debt to prevent
foreclosure on the property.140
C. A Comparison of the Tax Court's and Service's Approaches
The Tax Court has endeavored to allow taxpayer-sellers of
property the deferral of income inherent in the wraparound mort-
gage transaction only when they demonstrate that purchaser pay-
ments on the first mortgage are "at risk" in their hands.141 This
requirement can be justified on theoretical grounds as well as on
the ground of furthering the purpose of section 453.142
The Tax Court has injected the at risk requirement into the
Court found that this amounted to the purchaser taking the property subject
to the existing mortgage. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
138. See Hutchison v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1089, 1094 (1981). This would indi-
cate that the mortgagee considered the purchaser to be the primary obligor
and that the seller would be relieved of the primary responsibility on the
debt. Id. See supra notes 103-13, 126-29 and accompanying text.
139. See Hutchison v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1089 (1981), in which the circum-
stances indicated that the seller had closed out his interest in the property,
leaving the mortgagee and the purchaser to sort out their respective claims
against the property.
140. See id. at 1094.
141. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
142. An argument can be made that the purpose of spreading recognition of in-
come over payments as they are received should not apply to excess liability
(mortgage over basis). The rationale is that the seller has already recognized
the gain prior to sale by depreciating the property faster than the real value
decreased or by receiving cash from taking out the mortgage on the property.
Excess liability has created an inherent tax benefit by allowing the seller to
use tax-free cash, obtained on a loan secured by appreciated property value
which has not yet been taxed. Wiebusch v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 777, 780-81
(1973). However, obtaining a loan in excess of basis on appreciated property
is not an income recognition event. Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner,
198 F.2d 357,359 (2d Cir. 1952). It is not clear why a disposition of the property
on the installment method should cause recognition when the debt is not as-
sumed. Where the property is not disposed of and the owner obtains a loan
in excess of his basis in the property, the owner will pay back mortgage prin-
cipal with after-tax dollars and interest with pre-tax dollars because of the
interest deduction. Where the property is disposed of on the installment
method the result is the same-the seller will recognize income before or
concurrently with the payment on his mortgage principal, and therefore the
mortgage will be paid with after-tax dollars. When the debt is not assumed,
the seller has not closed out his interest in the property or his mortgage and
his gain should be recognized ratably pursuant to section 453. This is consis-
tent with the doctrine of the Woodsam case.
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analysis used in determining the basis of an installment obligation,
and, in so doing, it has made its wraparound cases comport with
the basis analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Crane v. Com-
missioner.143 In Crane, the Supreme Court held that an assumed
mortgage was included as part of the consideration paid for prop-
erty. A corollary to that holding is that the adjusted basis of prop-
erty includes the value of any mortgage used to finance the
acquisition of the property.144 The cost basis of property is thus
determined by the economic cost of the property and not by
whether it was purchased for cash or debt-financed.145
The installment obligation has a basis in the hands of the seller
equal to the value of the property sold to the purchaser.146 The
obligation is not the equivalent of payment for the property, be-
cause the seller may be forced to repossess his former property
should the purchaser default. Therefore, the installment obliga-
tion and the mortgage securing it do not represent a termination of
the seller's interest in the property. Instead, the obligation acts as
a substitute for the property until the purchaser makes actual pay-
ments for the property, each of which pro tanto terminates the
seller's interest in the property.
The payments a seller receives on the installment obligation
are part interest and part a return of his basis in the installment
note.147 The basis of the installment obligation will equal the face
amount of the note or some lesser principal amount, depending
upon whether interest is separately stated or included in the face
value of the note.14 8 The seller's basis in the installment obligation
includes his first mortgage on the property. He has, in effect, bor-
rowed money against the land to acquire the installment obliga-
tion. Since the installment obligation and the mortgage securing it
are merely substitutes for the property, only when the seller re-
ceives actual payments on the installment note is his basis in the
note liquidated; it is at that point that the tax consequences of the
underlying sale of property should attach. As the note's basis is
143. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
144. Id. at 11. See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1046 (1978); M. CHmELSTEm, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 229 (2d ed. 1979).
145. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 144, at 228-30.
146. See Davies, Zumpano & Mansfield, The IRS approach to the wrap-around
mortgage: a contradiction of tax fundamentals, 60 TAX ADVISER 260, 263
(1980).
147. Payment on any note is either a return of the money owed the holder of the
note or interest paid to the holder to compensate him for not demanding im-
mediate repayment of the value of the note. If the parties do not provide for
interest, it will be imputed into the contract pursuant to LRC. § 483 (1976).
148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(a) (1) (i) (1966) (interest imputed into face amount
of contract and treated as interest).
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liquidated, the gain on the sale is recognized and the seller will pay
tax on the gain before he makes payment to the mortgagee.
The Service has taken the position that whenever property is
sold which is mortgaged in excess of its basis, the seller will recog-
nize the excess as income in the year of sale.149 This is the Serv-
ice's approach even when a valid installment obligation and
wraparound mortgage are taken in exchange for the property.150
There are two problems with this approach. First, it ignores the
fact that the installment obligation only suspends the seller's in-
terest in his former property; termination occurs when the pur-
chaser actually pays for the property.'51 Second, and more
importantly, this approach ignores the Crane doctrine with respect
to the installment obligation held by the seller.152
By requiring the seller to recognize gain on the excess of the
mortgage on the property over his basis in the property, the Serv-
ice ignores the fact that the seller holds an installment note with a
basis equal to the value of the property which he exchanged for
the note. Under the Crane doctrine, the basis of the installment
obligation must include any debt financing used to acquire the ob-
ligation. This would encompass all mortgages on the property ex-
changed for the obligation, including those in excess of the
property's basis, but less than or equal to its current value. 53 The
149. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (ii), 1981-10 IRB. 14-15.
150. Id.
151. This is most clearly demonstrated by situations such as in United Pac. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 721 (1963), and Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24
T.C. 659 (1955), where the agreement between the parties explicitly provides
for, and the seller in fact makes, payments on the senior mortgage until the
purchaser formally assumes those payments. Before the assumption, while
the seller is responsible for the senior debt service, he retains part of his eq-
uity in the property, secured by the second "wrapped" mortgage. Upon the
formal assumption by the purchaser, the seller's remaining equity is usually
paid to him in cash.
152. Davies, Zumpano & Mansfield, supra note 146, at 263.
153. In Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), the
court held that obtaining a loan by mortgaging real property in excess of its
basis was not an event in which income was recognized, even though the tax-
payer received cash against the appreciated value of his property and the
loan was nonrecourse, ie., only the property could be used to satisfy the debt
if the taxpayer defaulted. Id. at 359. As a corollary to this holding, the basis
of the property was not increased because income was not recognized upon
obtaining the loan. Id. Because there was no increase in basis, the taxpayer-
owner realized a larger gain on the foreclosure sale of the property. Id. at
357-58. Gain on the foreclosure sale resulted because the existing mortgage
on the property was in excess of its basis. However, under the Crane and
Woodsam doctrines, the taxpayer could take the proceeds from the loan and
purchase another depreciable or non-depreciable asset and receive a full cost
basis for the new property, even though he had not paid tax on the money
used to purchase the new property. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 144, at
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Service apparently contemplates an exception to the Crane doc-
trine for installment obligations in that the basis of the obligation
would depend on the method of financing the obligation rather
than its economic cost.
In Crane, no distinction was drawn between recourse and
nonrecourse financing of real property. 54 The Tax Court, how-
ever, has distinguished between valid and invalid wraparound
mortgages which secure installment notes depending upon
whether the debt remains fully recourse solely to the seller-mort-
gagor. 55 The reason for the Tax Court's distinction is that the ba-
sis of the installment note will depend upon whether the seller will
actually receive payments on the note. 5 6 Where the purchaser
pays the mortgagee directly, the seller will not have a basis in the
note to the extent of the purchaser's direct payments. In such a
case, the seller enjoys the benefit of debt relief in the year the
property is sold. In contrast, where the seller-mortgagor remains
primarily liable on the note, his liability will be full recourse, and
the installment note will have a basis equal to the value of the
property sold. The Crane analysis is appropriate in this situation.
Hence, no constructive payment should be deemed received in the
year of sale when property is sold subject to a mortgage in excess
of basis and the basis of the installment note does, in fact, equal
the value of the property.
The Internal Revenue Service has maintained a litigating pos-
ture that mortgaged property sold is inevitably sold subject to the
mortgage. Thus the Service treats excess mortgage debt over basis
as a payment received by the seller in the year of sale. 57 This po-
sition has been embodied in the new regulations'58 promulgated to
carry out the provisions of section 453.159 However, section 453
236-39. If it is consistent with Crane and Woodsam to allow tax-free borrow-
ing against property when the proceeds are used to purchase another asset, it
is also consistent with those cases to allow a taxpayer to receive an install-
ment obligation (which is merely another asset) in exchange for property
mortgaged in excess of basis without income recognition. Further, the in-
stalment obligation's basis should equal the full value of the property ex-
changed for it.
154. See Davies, Zumpano & Mansfield, supra note 146, at 263 n.15.
155. See supra notes 103-29 and accompanying text.
156. Some commentators believe that the courts should not base the determina-
tion of the validity of wraparound financing on whether the seller remains
personally liable (full recourse) on the senior mortgage. See Davies,
Zumpano & Mansfield, supra note 146, at 265.
157. See supra note 57. But see Priv. Let. RuL 7814011 (Dec. 29, 1977); Priv. Let.
Rul. 7814010 (Dec. 23, 1977).
158. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (ii), 1981-10 LR.B. 14-15.
159. Congress granted the Secretary of the Treasury the power to promulgate
such regulations. LR.C. § 453(i) (1) (Supp. IV 1980). This part provides: "The
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does not address the issue of what constitutes a payment received
in the context of a sale of mortgaged property.160 The Installment
Sales Revision Act of 1980 did not change any part of section 453 in
a manner which would suggest that Congress meant to change the
conception of what constitutes a payment in the year of sale in the
case of a sale of mortgaged property.'6 '
Wraparound mortgages are mentioned in the Senate Report as
"ingenious... arrangements to qualify for installment method re-
porting."162 This statement was made in the context of the thiriy
percent limitation provision of prior section 453, which often was
violated in an invalid wraparound transaction or a regular install-
ment land sale when the excess of the mortgage over basis was
treated as a payment received in the year of sale.163 The Senate
Report indicates that it was the Finance Committee's understand-
ing that "[i]f title passes in the year of sale, the Internal Revenue
Service will treat the mortgage debt in excess of basis as a pay-
ment received in the year of the sale."164 Thus the committee felt
that it was eliminating the need to use wraparound mortgages by
abolishing the thirty percent rule.165 However, the Senate Report
does not refer to the more basic use of the wraparound mortgage to
defer recognition of income when installment reporting is avail-
able. Thus the underlying problem of timing the recognition of in-
come remains.
The Installment Sales Revision Act eliminated the thirty per-
cent rule and other technical qualifying sections in order to make
installment reporting more accessible to and less obtrusive on nor-
mal business transactions.166 The amendments to section 453 were
meant to make installment reporting available when the economic
substance of a transaction relating to the sale of property involved
the receipt of payments over a period of time. The committee ac-
Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out the provisions of this section." Id.
160. See LR.C. § 453(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Section'453(f) provides only that pay-
ment is not to include the receipt of evidences of indebtedness of the person
acquiring the property.
161. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 7, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4701-02.
162. Id. at 9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4703-04.
163. When the excess of mortgage over basis was deemed a payment received in
the year of sale, more than 30% of the sale price would often be received in
the year of sale, and under prior law this would disqualify the transaction
from installment reporting. Wraparounds were used to circumvent the 30%
rule.
164. SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9,1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4703-
04.
165. Id. at 9-10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4703-05.
166. Id. at 8, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4702-03.
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knowledged that the purpose of section 453 was "to permit the
spreading of the income tax over the period during which pay-
ments of the sales price [were] received.' 67
There appear to be two explanations for the provision in the
regulations that any mortgaged property sold in a wraparound
transaction shall be considered sold subject to the first mortgage.
Neither explanation comports with economic reality or the pur-
pose of section 453.
First, the regulations may intend to draw a distinction for tax
purposes between a wraparound mortgage and an installment land
contract or contract for deed.168 If so, the regulations should be
invalid. While there are differences between a wraparound mort-
gage and various types of land contracts, they are identical for pur-
poses of defining the parties' responsibilities for making actual
167. Id. at 7, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4701-02.
168. Arguably, this distinction is implicit in the Senate Report. The Finance Com-
mittee assumed that the Service would only attack the wraparound-type
transaction when title passed in the year of sale. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 162-65. This has some support from two letter rulings. See Priv. Let.
Rul. 7814011 (Dec. 29, 1977); Priv. Let. Rul. 7814010 (Dec. 23, 1977). In both
situations involved, the seller made all payments to the mortgagee, but the
purchaser had an option to pay the mortgagee directly upon the seller's de-
fault. Rather than assume its losing position reflected in United Pac. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 721 (1963), Estate of Lamberth v. Commissioner, 31
T.C. 302 (1958), and Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659 (1955), the
Service attempted to distinguish those cases. The distinctions drawn were:
(1) title did not pass in the year of sale in those cases, and (2) there were no
options evident in the cases. It seems that the option to pay the mortgagee
directly after the seller's default does not provide the purchaser any benefit
he would not otherwise have regarding protecting property in his possession.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. This should be distinguished from
a purchaser's option to pay the mortgagee before the seller's default. When
default has occurred, the mortgagee has already gone through the formalities
of demanding payment from the seller, the original mortgagor. This is proof
that the mortgagee was looking primarily to the seller for payment of the
mortgage. An option exercisable before default does not present these for-
malities and there is no proof that the mortgagee was looking primarily to the
seller for its payment on the mortgage. In this latter case, it is likely that the
purchaser will pay the seller's debt service directly by exercising the option
before the seller defaults. In any case, in the circumstances of the letter rul-
ings, the seller apparently did make the payments to the mortgagee. The
Service apparently relied primarily on the location of legal title in the two
letter rulings. This would be consistent with its position in Hutchison v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1089 (1981), and Goodman v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
684 (1980), which both involved wraparound mortgages. However, as dis-
cussed earlier, location of title should not be relevant to tax consequences
because it does not define a sale for tax purposes nor does it determine eligi-
bility for installment method reporting. See Levinton, supra note 61, at 170;
supra note 100. But see Gallagher, Wraparound Mortgages and Deferred Pay-
ment Sales of Real Property, 56 TAxEs 400 (1978) (arguing that location of
title is a good indicator for tax consequences in a wraparound transaction).
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payments on the first mortgage.169 Modernly, the location of legal
title is becoming less relevant for purposes of defining the seller's
remedies when the purchaser defaults in a sales transaction in-
volving land.170 Location of title is irrelevant for purposes of the
application of section 453. Under section 453, the critical inquiry is
whether the seller or purchaser is obligated, in fact, to make pay-
ments to the mortgagee. If the temporary regulations reflected this
position, they would not have changed the law to any great extent.
Installment land contracts would not fall under the proscription
dealing with wraparounds, and they would carry the potential for
beneficial tax treatment not expressly available for wraparounds
under the temporary regulations. Litigation would continue under
the "assumed or taken subject to" language retained in the tempo-
rary regulations'l7 from the prior regulations 7 2 in cases where the
taxpayer had the foresight to call his agreement an installment
land contract. As noted above, there is no reason to draw a distinc-
tion between a wraparound mortgage and an installment land con-
tract and only give the latter beneficial tax treatment.
The second, more likely explanation is that the regulations in-
tend to preclude the sale of mortgaged property unless the buyer
takes subject to or assumes the mortgage. If that is the intention,
the regulations should also be held invalid because they do not fur-
ther the purpose of section 453.173 There may be substantive non-
tax reasons for the use of either the wraparound mortgage or the
analogous installment land contract. 74 When these financing de-
vices are used, the purchaser and seller may have entered into a
binding agreement under which the purchaser, in fact, remits all
payments to the seller and the seller in fact, pays off the first mort-
gage with his own general funds. When a transaction is structured
in this manner, there is no relief of the mortgage debt in the year of
sale in any real economic sense. There seems to be no justifiable
reason to deny the parties the inherent benefits of their transac-
tion-the deferral of the gain realized because of the excess of the
169. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
170. See Comment, supra note 90, at 764, 776-88.
171. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (i), 1981-10 IR.B. 14-15.
172. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1960).
173. See supra notes 3, 95 and accompanying text.
174. The principal non-tax use of the wraparound mortgage is to provide financing
at lower interest rates than market rates. This can benefit both the purchaser
and the seller-mortgagor at the expense of the senior mortgagee. The seller
can afford to charge the purchaser a lower rate of interest because of the lev-
erage created by the inclusion of the low-interest senior mortgage in the
amount on which the buyer will pay interest. Financing at the lower rate will
also produce less burden on the property and assist in allowing it to pay for
itself. Davies, Zumpano, and Mansfield, supra note 146, at 261 n.1.
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mortgage over basis and the recognition of the gain as payments
are actually received.
The Tax Court's approach in dealing with these transactions
should be adopted in the final regulations because it effectively
protects the interests of both the government and the taxpayer.
When a transaction is found to in fact relieve the seller of his mort-
gage debt in the year of sale, recognition of income is appropriate.
The parameters set forth by the Tax Court effectively define when
a seller is relieved of his debt and, more importantly, when there is
no debt relief.
M. STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT AS PAYMENTS
RECEIVED IN THE YEAR OF SALE
When property is sold using the installment method, the seller
will receive payment in the form of one or more installment notes.
To secure payment of the notes, the seller frequently will retain a
security interest in the property.175 However, the purchaser may
require an unencumbered title to the property,176 or the seller may
desire a more assured and liquid source of security for the install-
ment notes in order to avoid the potential legal proceedings in-
volved in a foreclosure or judicial sale. 77 A point of tension arises
when the security is so assured and liquid that it appears that the
seller has actually received payment for the property in the year of
sale. 7 8
The standby letter of credit is a flexible security device that has
been used, with some success, to secure payment of installment
notes and avoid the constructive receipt of payment problem.179
The temporary regulations 180 and the Senate Report181 accompa-
nying the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 both manifest the
175. For a discussion of this type of arrangement in the context of the wraparound
mortgage or the installment land contract as the security device, see supra
part 11 of this Comment.
176. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179 (escrow substituted for a deed of
trust).
177. See, e.g., Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933 (1980); Watson v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 544 (1978), aft'd, 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).
178. See infra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
179. See Sprague v. United States, 627 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1980); Priv. Let. Rul.
8129092 (Apr. 23, 1981).
180. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (i), (iii), 1981-10 I.R.B. 14-15.
181. SENATE REPORT, mupra note 14, at 18, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4712-13. The Senate Report provides: "Under the bill, a third party guarantee
(including a standby letter of credit) will not be taken into account in deter-
mining if the buyer's evidence of indebtedness constitutes payment to the
seller." Id. See also LR.C. § 453(f) (3) (Supp. IV 1980) (evidence of indebted-
ness of the purchaser is not payment when received regardless of whether or
not it is guaranteed by a third party).
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congressional intention that a standby letter of credit, functioning
as a third party guarantee, will not be considered a payment re-
ceived in the year of sale.
A letter of credit is an agreement made by an issuer, usually a
bank, at the request of its customer, for the benefit of a third
party. 8 2 The issuer promises to pay the beneficiary or to negotiate
drafts drawn by the beneficiary when, as a condition precedent,
the beneficiary presents the necessary documents.183 These docu-
ments are specified in the letter of credit. 8 4
There are two types of letters of credit: the commercial letter
and the standby letter. The basic forms of the two types of letters
of credit are identical,185 but their purposes and the documents
presented to initiate payment are different for each type.
As in the wraparound mortgage transaction, the standby letter
of credit functions to allow the seller of property to defer taxable
gain over the period of time in which payments are actually re-
ceived.186 In contrast, the commercial letter of credit does not
function to allow a taxpayer to defer income because once the let-
ter is in his possession it is a payment mechanism rather than a
form of guarantee or security.187 Therefore, regardless of the name
given to a particular letter of credit, it is essential to be able to
identify its true nature by the presence or absence of certain sali-
ent features.
In addition to assuring that the letter of credit will be deemed a
standby letter of credit, the parties who choose to defer income
through this mechanism must structure their transaction so that
the letter is not treated as a payment received in the year that the
taxpayer obtains possession of the letter. If the letter of credit is
treated as a payment received in the year of sale, the entire gain on
the sale will be taxed to the seller in the year of sale because all
182. See Harfield, Letters of Credit, 76 BANKING L.J. 93 (1959). Harfield's definition
of a letter of credit is as follows:
First, a letter of credit is a contract which stands -by itself, entirely
separate and distinct from the contract or other relation between the
account party [the bank's customer] and the beneficiary, even
though that contract or relationship may have been the genesis of the
letter of credit. Second, in a letter of credit transaction, banks deal in
documents and not in merchandise. Third, the terms and conditions
of the contract which is embodied in the letter of credit must be
strictly performed.
Id. at 101.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Con-
tinues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 277 (1978).
186. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
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payments guaranteed by the letter of credit will be deemed actu-
ally received in the year of sale. 188
This section of the Comment will define the attributes of a
standby letter of credit which will adequately secure the seller of
property and avoid the risk that the security will be deemed pay-
ment for the property in the year of sale:
A. The Commercial Letter of Credit
The commercial letter of credit is a mechanism of payment
used in a sale of goods.189 From the outset, it is intended that the
seller will draw on the letter of credit as payment for the goods
sold.190 The following example illustrates a situation in which the
commercial letter of credit might be used and the mechanics of its
use. If a buyer and seller do not know each other, both may be
wary of taking the first step in the deal. The seller will not want to
send goods before receiving payment and the buyer will not want
to pay until receiving the goods. A bank which has confidence in
the buyer's ability to pay and which is known by the seller as a
creditworthy party can aid the transaction.'91 The buyer will apply
to the bank for a letter of credit in favor of the seller. The bank
promises to pay the seller when it is presented with shipping docu-
ments and other documents which assure the quantity and quality
of the goods shipped.192 The buyer will reimburse or prepay the
bank as well as pay a fee for the service.
It is important to note that any letter of credit is an agreement
between the issuer (bank) and the beneficiary (seller) even
though the buyer applies to the bank for the letter of credit; the
buyer's application is an independent agreement.193 The letter of
credit is also separate and independent from the underlying agree-
ment of sale between the buyer and the seller. 94 The bank's obli-
gation to pay the seller is based only upon the presentation of the
required documents;195 the bank cannot escape its obligation to
188. Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933 (1980).
189. Asociacion De Azucareros De Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423
F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970); Second Nat'l Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 F. 17 (3d
Cir. 1923).
190. See Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 185, at 278.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. J. WmmrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 712-13 (2d ed. 1980).
194. See Venizelos, SA v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 294 F. Supp. 246,248 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 425 F.2d 461, (2d Cir. 1970); Maurice O'Meara
Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925); U.C.C. § 5-114(1)
and Official Comment I.
195. Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 237 (1st
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bank-
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pay by asserting any defenses against the seller based on the un-
derlying agreement between the buyer and seller.196
The commercial letter of credit is an independent agreement
whereby the credit of the bank is substituted for the credit of the
buyer. The bank fully intends to pay the seller for the goods when
the documents presented to it indicate that the seller has per-
formed the underlying agreement.197 When a commercial letter of
credit is involved, the seller has constructive receipt of the pay-
ments embodied in the letter upon completion of his part of the
agreement. This is because once the seller completes his perform-
ance under the agreement, he may collect the payment, at his dis-
cretion, by presenting the shipping and quality documents that he
has procured through his performance. 9 8
Thus, a nominal standby letter of credit will not in fact qualify
as such when the documents which the seller must present to ob-
tain payment merely confirm the seller's performance on the un-
derlying agreement and his right to payment. This type of letter is
a commercial letter of credit,199 and payment is constructively re-
ceived by the seller when the credit is issued and the required per-
formance on the underlying agreement is completed.
This rationale was recognized in Watson v. Commissioner,200 in
a transaction in which the seller completed his contract for deliv-
ery of cotton and attempted to defer the income from the sale by
postponing collection on the letter of credit he had received in pay-
ment until the following year. The Tax Court found that the letter
of credit was the equivalent of cash 201 because it could be drawn
upon and converted into cash by presenting the documents which
proved delivery of the cotton. Because the seller had possession of
these documents from the time of delivery,202 he was required to
ers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aJ'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.
1962).
196. If the documents are forged or if there is fraud involved in the transaction,
(e.g., the seller fraudulently gives a misdescription of the goods shipped to
the buyer), the bank will be excused from honoring the letter of credit.
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 718, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631
(Sup. Ct. 1941). Even this exception is narrowly construed. See Harfield, The
Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 251, 256 (1972).
197. See Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAx. L REV.
716, 718-21 (1973).
198. See Watson v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 544 (1978), aff'd, 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1980).
199. The bank will receive documents of title from the seller which activate its
obligation to honor the letter of credit. The bank will simultaneously become
a secured creditor of the buyer by virtue of its possession of the documents of
title to the buyer's goods. See Verkuil, supra note 197, at 721.
200. 69 T.C. 544 (1978), a.fd, 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).
201. 69 T.C. at 552.
202. Id. at 551.
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recognize income in the year of delivery under the cash-
equivalency theory.203
It may appear that immediate income recognition could be
avoided in the above situation by a provision in the letter of credit
specifically making payment due in a subsequent year.204 How-
ever, this attempt at income deferral will fail. If the proceeds of
the letter of credit are assignable, it is still the equivalent of
cash.205
The commercial letter of credit is assignable and its cash
equivalency retained because potential assignees (usually banks)
are willing to discount letters of credit and advance cash to sellers
in exchange for the letters of credit. The seller will be able to as-
sign the letter of credit because assignees know that the issuing
bank will be required to pay the amount due upon presentation of
the specified delivery documents, regardless of any defenses on
the underlying transaction between the buyer and seller.206
The commercial letter of credit transaction itself is executory
until the seller or his assignees present the shipping and quality
documents prescribed in the letter of credit.207 When that occurs,
the bank becomes obligated on the letter of credit and will pay the
seller from its own funds. From that point, the bank has loaned its
money to the buyer and the buyer is absolutely obligated to reim-
burse the bank pursuant to its application for the letter of credit,208
regardless of whether the goods comply with the underlying con-
tract of sale.209 The bank acquires a perfected security interest in
the documents of title covering the goods simultaneously with the
creation of the loan.2 10 The documents of title thus secure the
buyer's absolute obligation to reimburse the bank, and the bank is
maximally secured in a transaction in which it knows that it will be
required to make payment on the letter of credit.
From Watson and the temporary regulation language referring
203. Id. at 552.
204. See id. at 553.
205. Id. at 551. The court noted. "Security Bank had received the purchase price
of the cotton ... and, therefore, had no legitimate concern as to whether it
paid peititoner or someone else .... Consistent with these realities....
even though the letter of credit states it is nontransferable ... ,the benefici-
ary may 'assign his right to proceeds'." Id.
206. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
207. Verkuil, supra note 197, at 723.
208. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1981), which provides: "[L]etters of credit should be
issued in conformity with the following- . . . (e) the bank's customer should
have an unqualified obligation to reimburse the bank for payments made
under the letter of credit." See, e.g., Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962).
209. Verkuil, supra note 197, at 720 & n.26.
210. Id. at 721.
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to a standby letter of credit functioning as a guarantee between the
parties, 211 it is clear that the letter of credit which Congress con-
templated would not constitute receipt of payment in the year of
sale is different from the traditional commercial letter of credit in
one major respect. The parties must not look to the letter of credit
as the primary source from which payment for the sale will be
made.212
The necessity of keeping the primary source of payment sepa-
rate from the security in a transaction is consistent with the gen-
eral theory of constructive receipt developed by the Tax Court in
escrow cases. 2 13 When payments on an installment note are se-
cured by funds placed in escrow, the seller will be treated as hav-
ing received the payments in escrow in the year of sale unless
there is a substantial restriction on the certainty of the funds be-
coming available to him.214 This result obtains because the es-
crow, rather than the buyer, is the primary source from which
payment on the notes will be collected.215 Unless there is some
211. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (iii), 1981-10 LR.B. 14-15. The regula-
tion provides in part: 'The term 'standby letter of credit' means a non-negoti-
able, non-transferable ... letter of credit, issued by a bank or other financial
institution, which serves as a guarantee of the evidence of indebtedness
which is secured by the letter of credit." Id.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Trivett v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 77,161 (1977), afd, 611 F.2d
655 (6th Cir. 1979); Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971); Pozzi v. Com-
missioner, 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
214. Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179. The restriction must be the result of a sub-
stantive contingency regarding the availability of the funds to the seller. The
contingency should be for the benefit of the purchaser. For example, in Stiles
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 558 (1978), the court held that there was no construc-
tive receipt of funds placed in escrow. The trustee had discretion to prevent
the funds from passing to the seller if it determined that the seller had not
disclosed his knowledge of liabilities of the corporation whose stock was the
subject of the installment sale. Additionally, if any self-dealing arrangements
between the seller and the corporation had been discovered, the escrowed
funds would have been forfeited to an appropriate extent.
215. Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971). In Oden, payments were made to
the seller directly from the escrow account. The bank, which also served as
escrow agent, would cash a certificate of deposit placed in escrow (and in a
face amount equal to each installment payment) and send a check for the
interest earned to the buyer and deliver the face amount directly to the seller
by a bank check. The seller was found to have constructively received the
payments when they were placed in escrow. In Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 119 (1967), the formalities of treating the escrow as security were ob-
served and payments were not made directly from the escrow account to the
seller. Instead the buyer remitted payment to a bank, which then deposited
the payment in the seller's account. The bank was also the trustee of the
funds escrowed as security for the buyer's obligation to pay the seller, and, as
each payment was received, a portion of the escrowed funds was released to
the buyer. The seller was found to be in constructive receipt of the escrowed
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restriction other than the passage of time on the availability of the
funds to the seller,21 6 the seller has the certain economic benefit of
the escrow from the moment the escrow is created.21 7
Thus it is initially possible to identify two features of a letter of
credit which will not pass muster under the temporary regulations.
First, the parties should not intend to use the letter of credit as the
primary source of payments. 21 8 Second, the documents presented
to trigger payment on the letter of credit should not be a confirma-
tion that the seller has performed his obligations and is thus enti-
tled to demand payment.21 9
B. The Standby Letter of Credit and its Role as a Guarantee
As noted previously, a standby letter of credit is identical in
form to a commercial letter of credit.220 The differences for tax
purposes may be gleaned from the negative implications of the
commercial letter of credit. A standby letter of credit operates as a
guarantee of or security for payment rather than as a mechanism
of payment;221 accordingly, the parties do not expect the credit to
be drawn upon.222 Moreover, the documents presented to initiate
and authorize payment under the standby letter of credit consist of
a draft, plus documents which certify the buyer's nonperformance
or default on its installment obligation.223 As discussed, the docu-
ments presented in a commercial letter of credit transaction prove
the seller's performance.
funds in the year of sale because the court viewed the circuitous routing of
money as a sham. Id. at 128. See Comment, Installment Sales-Income Tax
Consequences of Certificates of Deposit as Security, 41 TENN. L. REV. 113
(1973).
216. See Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-1 C.B. 179.
217. See Trivett v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 77,161 (1977), a.O'd, 611 F.2d 655
(6th Cir. 1979).
218. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
221. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1160(a), 337.2(a) (1981). Both the F.D.LC. (id. § 337.2(a)) and
the Comptroller of the Currency (id. § 7.1160(a)) define the standby letter of
credit identically:
A "standby letter of credit" is any letter of credit, or similar arrange-
ment however named or described, which represents an obligation to
the beneficiary [the seller] on the part of the issuer (1) to repay
money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the account
party [the purchaser, who is also the bank's customer] or (2) to
make payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the
account party, or (3) to make payment on account of any default by
the account party in the performance of an obligation.
222. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) n.1 (1981). See Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 185, at
279.
223. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977); Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976).
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The primary function of the standby letter of credit is to assure
a creditor that its debtor will repay indebtedness to the creditor.224
The letter serves as security for a note, and neither the bank nor
its customer (the buyer or the person seeking the bank's credit)
anticipate that the letter will be the primary source from which
payment will be made. However, the bank does lend its credit to
the customer,225 and the letter of credit is treated as a loan to the
customer.22 6 The nature of the "loan" in a standby letter of credit
transaction is different from the "loan" in a commercial letter of
credit situation. The loan in the former is inherently unsecured,
and thus the bank will often attempt to protect itself by requiring
security before issuing the credit. This requirement of security
gives rise to a constructive receipt problem which is discussed
below.
When a standby letter of credit is used, the customer/buyer al-
ready has a definite obligation to pay a party to a transaction, and
the bank bears the risk that the customer will not pay. The docu-
ments which trigger the bank's obligation to pay are affidavits of its
customer's default. These documents do not provide any security
which assures the bank of recouping the payment made for its cus-
tomer as is the case with the commercial letter of credit transac-
tion.22 7 As one commentator noted: "Banks do not receive the face
amount of the standby letter of credit at the time of issuance, as
they do when they issue a certificate of deposit .... ,"228 The
standby credit is thus the functional equivalent of an unsecured
loan because of the possibility that the customer will default, and
the bank will be required to pay its own money under the letter of
credit.
Standby letters of credit are treated as loans in calculating a
customer's loan limit,229 and such letters are only issued after the
bank engages in a credit analysis equal to that required for an ac-
tual loan.230 The bank will take a security interest in the cus-
tomer's property to the extent deemed necessary to adequately
assure the recovery of its potential payment on behalf of its cus-
tomer.23 ' As discussed later,232 the type of security the bank re-
224. See supra note 221.
225. Harfleld, supra note 196, at 259.
226. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1160(b), 337.2(b) (1981).
227. The bank thus runs the risk of becoming an unsecured creditor, which would
threaten bank solvency. See Verkuil, supra note 197, at 723.
228. Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 185, at 287.
229. 12 C.F.RL § 7.1160(b) (1981) (national banks); id. § 337.2(b) (state banks
through F.DJ.C. regulations). Commercial letters of credit are not subject to
the lending limit requirements. Id. §§ 7.1160, 337.2.
230. See Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 185, at 285.
231. Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933 (1980).
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quires of the buyer of property may become important in
determining whether the value of the standby letter of credit is
recognized as income by the seller.
The standby letter of credit must function as a third party guar-
antee if its value is not to be deemed a payment in the year of sale
under the temporary regulations. 233 This requirement appears to
mean that the bank must become obligated to extend its own
credit for the benefit of the seller of property to assure payment of
the buyer's (its customer's) installment obligation to the seller.
The bank would not serve as the primary source of payment on the
underlying obligation, or as an agent, holding the buyer's funds in
a segregated account for the benefit of the seller. Rather, the
standby letter of credit must be an agreement whereby the general
credit234 of the bank secures its customer's (the buyer's) obliga-
tions.23 5 As evidence that the letter of credit is only security for
the obligation, documentation of default on a bona fide underlying
installment note should be required.236
In the usual standby letter of credit transaction, the credit will
be secured by the general funds of the bank rather than the specifi-
cally identified funds of the customer. Although the standby letter
of credit functions as a guarantee because the bank uses its funds
to guarantee payment of the customer's obligation, it is not a guar-
antee as that term is generally understood.237 With the ordinary
guarantee, an obligation arises under the guarantee only after the
primary obligor has infact238 defaulted on the underlying guaran-
teed obligation. The guarantor is secondarily liable on the same
agreement that bound the primary obligor, and any defenses to
nonperformance available to the primary obligor are also available
232. See infra notes 242-59 and accompanying text.
233. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (iii), 1981-10 LR.B. 14-15.
234. By virtue of its independence from the underlying agreement between the
buyer and seller, the bank is primarily liable on the letter of credit. See infra
notes 237-41 and accompanying text. This requires the bank to put its own
credit behind the letter of credit. U.C.C § 5-117 and Official Comment. The
comment provides: "[T] he bank which issues a letter of credit acts as a prin-
cipal, not as agent for its customer, and engages its own credit." U.C.C. § 5-
117, Official Comment.
235. If the bank held its customer's payment for disbursement to the seller, it
would act as an escrow agent and the amount so held would be constructively
received by the seller. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
237. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
465 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1972); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Marquette Nat'l
Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976); American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover
Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
238. See Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 185, at 279.
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to the guarantor.239 In contrast, the standby letter of credit is an
independent agreement between the bank and beneficiary
(seller), and the seller may recover upon presenting the bank with
documents demonstrating default of the obligor, whether or not
default has in fact occurred.240 The primary liability of the bank on
this separate agreement 241 indicates that its general funds are
used to pay the standby credit. The bank must rely on whatever
security it has procured to obtain reimbursement from its cus-
tomer, the defaulting purchaser.
Prior to the temporary regulations, the Service argued that a
standby letter of credit should be treated as a payment actually
received by the seller, the beneficiary of the letter.242 The
predominate theory was that the seller had constructively received
the value of the letter of credit. The temporary regulations, how-
ever, contemplate that standby letters of credit may not always be
subject to constructive receipt treatment, and provide some gui-
dance in that regard. For example, to avoid being treated as a pay-
ment received in the year of sale, the standby letter of credit must
239. See, e.g., Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d
1285 (9th Cir. 1974). In Wichita Eagle, the court found that a purported letter
of credit was in reality a guarantee because the bank's obligation to pay
under the letter of credit was premised upon demonstration of factual default
on the underlying agreement rather than on the presentation of documents.
The court stated.
Where, as here, the substantive provisions require the issuer to deal
not simply in documents alone, but in facts relating to the perform-
ance of a separate contract (the lease, in this case), all distinction
between a letter of credit and an ordinary guaranty contract would
be obliterated by regarding the instrument as a letter of credit.
Id. at 1286. In other words, if the issuer is secondarily liable on the primary
obligor's agreement, a guarantee exists. See Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercan-
tile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139
(1974).
240. Even if the underlying agreement between the buyer and seller is illegal or
has been modified, the letter of credit securing performance on the agree-
ment must be honored by the issuer upon presentation of the appropriate
documents. Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211 (10th
Cir. 1972) (modification); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank,
419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976) (illegality). In the letter of credit transaction,
the bank cannot look beyond the validity of the documents when determining
whether it is obligated to honor the credit.
241. The standby letter of credit transaction involves three separate agreements:
the underlying agreement (in this context, the installment note), the applica-
tion for the letter of credit, and the letter of credit itself. All three are in-
dependent from each other, including the application, which is solely
between the issuer and the customer. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank,
550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977).
242. See, e.g., Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933 (1980); Watson v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 544 (1978), affid, 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).
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be irrevocable and nonassignable under local law.243 However, the
regulations provide that the proceeds of the letter of credit may be
assigned without affecting the instrument's qualification as a
standby letter of credit.244
Despite the above provisions, the temporary regulations do not
directly address a major issue in the application of the construc-
tive receipt theory to standby letters of credit. There appears to be
a proposition developing under which the validity of the standby
letter of credit may turn on the type of security that the issuing
bank requires from the buyer/customer in the application for the
letter of credit.245 If the requisite collateral is illiquid property, the
credit will stand. However, if certificates of deposit are required,
the letter of credit may be deemed the equivalent of an escrow ac-
count, and the seller will recognize income upon creation of the
letter of credit through the application of the constructive receipt
theory. 46 Since the regulations do not directly address and re-
solve this issue, a brief recounting of the development of this prop-
osition will be provided, followed by an inquiry into the propriety
of basing the validity of a standby letter of credit on the type of
security that the issuing bank requires from the buyer in the appli-
cation for the credit.
In Griffith v. Commissioner,247 the bank issuing the letter of
credit required its customer, the buyer, to provide certificates of
deposit as security to protect it in the event of the customer's de-
fault on the underlying obligation and the bank's payment under
the letter of credit.24 8 The court held that the bank was actually
holding the certificates of deposit for eventual payment to the ben-
eficiary-seller.249 The court apparently viewed the safe, liquid na-
ture of the security as an indication that the letter of credit was
intended to serve as the primary source of payment of the buyer's
installment obligation to the seller, analogous to an escrow trans-
action.250 Therefore, the court found that the value of the letter of
243. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15aA53-1(b) (3) (iii), 1981-10 LR.B. 14-15.
244. Id. This provision will eliminate complicated factual inquiries as to whether
the seller could obtain the market value of the note by discounting it in the
marketplace. See Sprague v. United States, 627 F.2d 1044, 1049-50 (10th Cir.
1980) (complicated factual analysis demonstrating that the seller could not
have obtained the fair market value of the installment note by assigning the
proceeds of the letter of credit securing the note).
245. See infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
247. 73 T.C. 933 (1980).
248. Id. at 936.
249. Id. at 943.
250. The court primarily relied upon Oden v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 569 (1971). Id.
at 943. In Oden, the bank served as an escrow agent and not as a primary
obligor on a letter of credit. See supra note 215.
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credit was constructively received in the year of sale,25 ' and, in ef-
fect, ignored the separate nature of the application for the letter of
credit and the letter of credit itself.252
It is not clear if reasons other than the nature of the security led
to the Griffith court's treatment of the standby letter of credit as
similar to an escrow arrangement. There were substantial differ-
ences. The letter of credit was an independent agreement between
the seller and the bank, and the seller looked to the general credit
of the bank for his payment. The bank's reimbursement agree-
ment with the buyer was of no concern to the seller because the
seller was not a party to that agreement.253 Further, the seller
could collect on the letter of credit only after presenting the bank
documentation of the buyer's default.254 The court apparently con-
sidered the documentation of default a sham, but it did not indi-
cate why the documents were not bona fide affidavits of default on
the underlying installment note.2 55
Nevertheless, the Griffith analysis poses the risk that when cer-
tificates of deposit or other types of liquid security are utilized in a
standby letter of credit transaction, the court may collapse the sep-
arate application for the letter of credit and the letter itself into
one agreement. As a result, the bank, the buyer, and the seller are
treated as parties to a transaction in which the bank functions as
an escrow agent for the buyer and seller.256
A further illustration of the emphasis that courts may be giving
to the type of security required by the issuing bank is reflected in
Sprague v. United States.257 In that case, the court held that a
standby letter of credit did not constitute a payment in the year of
sale of the property involved. One of the bases for the court's hold-
ing was that the bank did not require certificates of deposit as se-
curity258 for its customer's obligation to reimburse the bank in the
event that it was required to pay under the letter of credit. Simi-
larly, Letter Ruling 8129092,259 issued after and relying upon the
temporary regulations, also appears to place some emphasis on
251. 73 T.C. at 943.
252. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 241.
254. 73 T.C. at 938.
255. Id. The default documents were to be prepared solely by the seller and no
notice of default was required to be sent to the buyer before drawing upon
the bank's letter of credit. This unilateral ability to invoke the terms of the
letter of credit led the court to find that the seller had constructively received
the value of the letter of credit. Id.
256. See Griffith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 933, 935-36 (1980).
257. 627 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1980).
258. Id. at 1049-50.
259. Priv. Let. Rul. 8129092 (Apr. 23, 1981).
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the nature of the collateral that the bank requires as security from
its customer. In the Letter Ruling, the Service indicated that the
standby letter of credit involved would not constitute a payment in
the year of sale. One relevant factor was that the bank charged a
fee to issue the letter of credit, but that the seller did not deposit
the amount of the installment notes as collateral with the bank.
The type of security that an issuing bank requires from its cus-
tomer (the buyer) appears to be a poor factor upon which to base
the validity of a standby letter of credit for several reasons. First,
constructive receipt issue should be foreclosed because the
standby letter of credit, by its terms and legal interpretation, cre-
ates a primary obligation 260 between the bank and the beneficiary-
seller, pursuant to which the seller looks to the bank for payment.
The arrangements for the bank's repayment should not affect the
standby letter of credit as they are controlled by the application for
the letter of credit,261 an agreement between the bank and its cus-
tomer, the buyer. The seller is not a party to that agreement, and
his tax consequences should not depend upon the type of security
demanded by his purchaser's bank.
Second, focusing on the nature of the security would result in
different tax consequences in two identical transactions. This type
of result has been rejected in cases in which taxpayers have at-
tempted to justify deductions on the theory that a well-secured
note, given as payment for an obligation, was the equivalent of
cash.262 In these cases, the well-secured notes, certain to be paid,
were found not to be the equivalent of cash. The nature and quali-
ty of the collateral which secured the notes was not relevant to the
issue of when amounts were deemed paid for purposes of taking a
deduction, and there is no apparent reason for treating this issue
differently in the constructive receipt situation.
Finally, the temporary regulations do not contain language
which compels the conclusion that the nature of collateral re-
quired by the buyer's bank must be considered in determining the
validity of a standby letter of credit. The regulations provide:
Payments include amounts actually or constructively received in the taxa-
ble year .... Receipt of an evidence of indebtedness which is secured di-
rectly or indirectly by cash or a cash equivalent, such as a bank certificate
of deposit or a treasury note, will be treated as the receipt of payment
2 6 3
260. See supra notes 220-41 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 208, 241 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Williams v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); Helvering v. Price, 309
U.S. 409 (1940); Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 140 (1931); Patmon, Young & Kirk,
P.C. v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1976); Wasatch Chemical Co. v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 817 (1962), remanded, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963).
263. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (i), 1981-10 LR.B. 14-15 (emphasis
added).
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This language does not address a standby letter of credit issued by
a bank for the benefit of a seller. Such a credit is not an evidence
of indebtedness between the bank and the seller. The seller's evi-
dence of indebtedness is the buyer's installment note, which is se-
cured directly by the general credit of the bank.264 While the
bank's loan of credit may be secured directly by a cash equivalent,
that security is a feature of the agreement between the bank and
its customer, embodied in the application for the letter of credit.265
Such security is required to protect the bank, not the seller. Fur-
ther, it appears that the seller's note is not even indirectly secured
by a cash equivalent because the seller does not ordinarily look
beyond the bank to collect when the buyer defaults on the note.26 6
Thus, as long as the standby letter of credit is structured so that
the general credit of the bank secures the installment note, con-
structive receipt of the value of the standby letter of credit should
not be found.
A final feature which is essential for an instrument to qualify as
a standby letter of credit relates to the necessity of proving default
on the underlying installment obligation before drawing upon the
letter of credit.26 7 In Griffith v. Commissioner,268 the required doc-
umentation of default was a simple affidavit signed by the seller.
The Tax Court was reluctant to find substance in this type of ar-
rangement because it appeared that it was too easy for the seller to
fall back on the bank's security.269 In Sprague v. United States,270
the same unilateral type of documentation was required, but the
court found that the transaction nevertheless had substance be-
cause of additional circumstances present in the case. The buyer
had sued to enjoin the seller from collecting directly on the letter
of credit; thus it appeared that the buyer wanted the credit to func-
tion as security rather than as a substitute for its underlying in-
stallment obligation.271
A more conservative course of action would be for the parties to
require that the documentation of the buyer's default include a bi-
lateral communication between the buyer and seller. For example,
the seller could send an initial notice of default to both the buyer
264. See supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 208, 241 and accompanying text.
266. American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Natl Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459,464 (1976).
267. See Temporary Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b) (3) (iii), 1981-10 LRlB. 14-15 which
provides: "A letter of credit is not a standby letter of credit if it may be drawn
upon in the absence of default in payment of the underlying evidence of
indebtedness."
268. 73 T.C. 933 (1980).
269. See supra note 255.
270. 627 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1980).
271. Id. at 1050.
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and the bank, requesting the buyer to cure its default. After a rea-
sonable time had elapsed, perhaps thirty days, the seller could
send the bank a second notice reaffirming the default and the lack
of curative action by the buyer. At this time, the seller could exer-
cise the election to collect under the standby letter of credit. A
similar procedure was deemed adequate in Letter Ruling
8129092.272
When complete documentation of default is assured and the in-
strument provides that the general credit of the bank is the seller's
source of security, a valid standby letter of credit should be found
to exist. Additionally, the buyer should avoid depositing cash
equal to the face amount of the installment obligation273 to secure
his reimbursement obligation to the bank. When these procedures
are followed, the standby letter of credit should not constitue re-
ceipt of payment in the year of sale of the property.
IV. CONCLUSION
By using the wraparound mortgage and the standby letter of
credit in transactions involving sales of property, taxpayers have
the opportunity to spread recognition of income over the payments
as they are actually received under an installment obligation.
When transactions involving these devices are carefully planned,
taxpayers should be able to attain the beneficial results contem-
plated by the installment sales provision of the Internal Revenue
Code. Yet income recognition which is triggered by the construc-
tive receipt of payment in the year of sale remains an important
issue in installment sales reporting. In the case of the wraparound
mortgage, the temporary regulations are arguably invalid, and the
benefits of the wraparound device should be attainable by struc-
turing the transaction along the judicially defined parameters in
the area. With respect to the standby letter of credit, favorable
treatment should be available by following the guidelines set forth
in the temporary regulations and interpreting them with an aware-
ness of the general letter of credit case law.
Chris A. Horacek '82
272. Priv. Let. Rul. 8129092 (Apr. 23, 1981).
273. See supra notes 245-59 and accompanying text.
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